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ABSTRACT
A Large-scale Evaluation of Privacy Practices of Public WiFi Captive
Portals
Suzan Ali Ahmad Ali
Open access WiFi hotspots are widely deployed in many public places, including restau-
rants, parks, coffee shops, shopping malls, trains, airports, hotels, and libraries. While
these hotspots provide an attractive option to stay connected, they may pose security and
privacy risks to users. Several past studies focused on privacy leakage from browsing the
internet or using mobile apps in an open hotspot, due to the nature of these hotspots, and the
use of HTTP, as opposed to HTTPS for connections between the user device and the web
service. The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) acknowledges those risks and advises
public WiFi users to take reasonable measures while using such networks.
To complement previous efforts in analyzing security and privacy risks of using
public WiFi hotspots, we design two comprehensive frameworks. The first framework
(CPInspector) is designed to analyze the tracking behaviors and privacy leakage on
public WiFi captive portals—where users typically agree to the hotspot’s terms or some-
times register before being allowed to access the internet. CPInspector performs a wide
range of web tracking measurements on public WiFi captive portals for both Windows and
iii
Android; we must physically visit each hotspot and run the CPInspector on the hotspot cap-
tive portal. We also inspect the personal data collection practices of those hotspots and the
security measures adopted to protect users’ information. Hotspots pose some unique risks
due to their access to the users’ foot traffic, browsing habits, the device MAC address, and
in certain cases, personal information such as name, email address, social media profile,
location and employment history. Using CPInspector, we initially conducted a comprehen-
sive privacy analysis of 80 public WiFi hotspot locations in Montreal, Canada. Our analysis
reveals the collection of a significant amount of privacy-sensitive personal data through the
use of social login (e.g., Facebook and Google) and registration forms, and many instances
of tracking activities, sometimes even before the user accepts the hotspot’s privacy and
terms of service policies. We also analyzed 98 hotspot locations in Montreal for ad injec-
tion, but we did not observe any content modification attempts. Next, we expanded our
study to hotspots from other cities in Canada, Europe, and the US. We conducted a high-
level comparative analysis of tracking behaviors of those hotspots (in total, 192 public WiFi
hotspot locations; including Montreal hotspots). We conclude that some of our findings are
indeed applicable to a larger geographical area, including the use of third-party trackers
on captive portals and sharing the harvested data with third-party entities using third-party
captive portals.
We use the second framework to analyze hotspots privacy policies and terms-of-use
documentation which also discloses the service provider’s data and privacy practices. We
augment our policy analysis using our collected hotspots’ datasets to validate selected pri-
vacy aspects of the public WiFi. We evaluated a sample of 16 privacy policy and TOS
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documents from hotspots that appear to be most risky in Montreal, Canada. Our analysis
reveals many instances where the hotspot may appear to conform to privacy best practices
according to its documentation but fail to implement necessary technical measures.
v
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Public WiFi hotspots are growing in popularity across the globe. Most users frequently
connect to hotspots due to their free-of-cost service, (as opposed to mobile data connec-
tions) and ubiquity. According to a Symantec study [56] conducted among 15,532 users
across 15 global markets, 46% of participants do not wait more than a few minutes before
connecting to a WiFi network after arriving at an airport, restaurant, shopping mall, hotel or
similar locations. Furthermore, 60% of the participants are unaware of any risks associated
with using an untrusted network, and feel their personal information is safe.
A hotspot may have a captive portal, which is usually used to communicate the hotspot’s
privacy and terms-of-service (TOS) policies, and collect personal identification information
such as name and email for future communications, and authentication if needed (e.g., by
asking the user to login to their social media sites). Upon acceptance of the hotspot’s policy,
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the user is connected to the internet and her web browser is often automatically directed to
load a landing page (usually the service provider’s webpage).
Several past studies (e.g., [13, 54]) focused on privacy leakage from browsing the in-
ternet or using mobile apps in an open hotspot, due to the lack of encryption, e.g., no
WPA/WPA2 support at the hotspot, and the use of HTTP, as opposed to HTTPS for connec-
tions between the user device and the web service. However, in recent years, HTTPS adop-
tion across web servers has increased dramatically, mitigating privacy exposure through
plain network traffic. For example, according to the Google Transparency Report [26], as
of April 6, 2019, 82% of web pages are served via HTTPS for Chrome users on Windows.
On the other hand, in the recent years, there have also been several comprehensive stud-
ies on web tracking on regular web services and mobile apps with an emphasis on most
popular domains/services (see e.g., [9, 10, 21]).
In contrast to past hotspot and web privacy measurement studies, we analyze tracking
behaviors and privacy leakage in WiFi captive portals and landing pages. We design a
data collection framework (CPInspector) for both Windows and Android, and capture
raw traffic traces from several public WiFi that require users to go through a captive portal
before allowing internet access. Challenges here include: manual collection of captive
portal data by physically visiting each hotspot; making our test environment separate from
the regular user environment so that we do not affect the user’s browsing profiles; ensuring
that our tests remain unaffected by the user’s past browsing behaviors (e.g., saved tracking
cookies); and creating and monitoring several test accounts in popular social media or email
services as some hotspots mandate such authentication.
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From each hotspot evaluated in Montreal (Canada), we collect traffic using both Chrome
and Firefox on Windows. In addition to the default browsing mode, we also use private
browsing, and deploy two ad-blockers to check if such privacy-friendly environments help
against captive portal trackers—leading to a total of eight datasets for each hotspot. We
also use social logins (Facebook, LinkedIn, Google, Instagram, Twitter) if required by the
captive portal, or provided as an option; we again use both browsers for social login tests
(two to six additional datasets as we have observed at most three social login options per
hotspot). Some hotspots also require the user to complete a registration form that collects
the user’s PII—in such cases, we collect two more datasets (from both browsers). Finally,
some hotspots collect additional personal information as part of an optional survey. When
reporting statistics on tracking domains and cookies, we accumulate the distinct trackers as
observed in all the datasets collected for a given hotspot.
On Android, we collect traffic only from the custom captive portal app (as opposed to
Chrome/Firefox on Windows) as the cookie store of this app is separate from browsers.
Consequently, tracking cookies from the Android captive portal app cannot be used by
websites loaded in a browser. Recent Android OSes also use dynamic MAC addresses,
limiting MAC address-based tracking. However, we found that cookies in the captive portal
app may remain valid for up to 20 years, allowing effective tracking by hotspot providers.
Note: by default, all our statistics refer to the measurements on Windows; we explicitly
mention when results are for Android (mostly in Sec.3.2).
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1.2 Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We design, develop, and implement a framework (CPInspector)1 that perform
a wide range of web tracking measurements on public WiFi captive portal for both
Windows and Android. Using our framework, we conducted two phases of data col-
lection and analysis of public WiFi hotspots. First, we collected data from 80 hotspot
locations in Montreal (Quebec), Canada. Then we extended our data collection to
a wider geographical area, including other cities in Canada, Europe and the US. In
total, we collected and analyzed 192 public WiFi hotspot locations, making this the
largest such study to characterize hotspots in terms of their privacy risks.
2. In phase one, we collected a total of 679 datasets from the captive portal and land-
ing page of 80 hotspot locations in Montreal, Canada between September 2018 to
April 2019. We analyzed over 18.5GB of collected traffic for privacy exposure and
tracking, and report the results from 67 unique hotspots. We show the collection of a
significant amount of privacy-sensitive personal data through the use of social login
(e.g., Facebook and Google) and registration forms, and many instances of tracking
activities, sometimes even before the user accepts the hotspot’s privacy and terms
of service policies. Most hotspots use persistent third-party tracking cookies within
their captive portal site; these cookies can be used to follow the user’s browsing be-
havior long after the user leaves the hotspots, e.g., up to 20 years. Moreover, several
1https://github.com/MadibaLab/CPInspector
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hotspots explicitly share (sometimes via HTTP) the collected personal and unique
device information with many third-party tracking domains. Additionally, from our
Android experiments, we reveal that hotspots can effectively track Android devices
even though Android uses a separate captive portal app and randomizes MAC address
as visible to the hotspot.
3. We also design our framework to detect ad/content injection by hotspots. We col-
lected over 8.7GB traffic (346 datasets) by crawling two honey websites and BBC.
com from 98 hotspot locations (hotspots without captive portals are also included).
We did not observe any content modification attempts by the hotspots.
4. In phase two, we collected a total of 130 datasets from the captive portal and landing
page of 112 hotspot locations in Ontario (39; Canada), Luxembourg (43; Europe),
Netherlands (3; Europe), France (2; Europe), and New York (25, USA) between July
2019 to October 2019.2 We conducted a high-level comparative analysis of tracking
behaviors of those hotspots (in total, 192 public WiFi hotspot locations; including
Montreal hotspots). We conclude that some of our reported findings, from phase
one, are applicable to a larger geographical area including, the use of third-party
trackers on captive portals and sharing the harvested data with third-party entities
through the use third-party captive portal.
5. Finally, we propose a framework to analyze hotspots privacy policies and terms-
of-use documentation. We augment our policy analysis by the use of our collected
2We stopped collecting datasets from Firefox as the collected datasets were largely the same. We also
stopped collecting datasets in private browsing, ad-blockers, and Android as the focus in this phase is to
compare tracking behaviors between hotspots in Europe, Canada, and the US.
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hotspots’ datasets to validate some of those privacy practices. We evaluated a sample
of 16 privacy policy and TOS documents from hotspots that appear to be most risky
in Montreal, Canada. Our analysis reveals many instances where the hotspot may
appear to conform to privacy best practices according to its documentation. but fail
to implement necessary technical measures.
Some of the work discussed in this dissertation has been peer-reviewed and published
in the following article: Suzan Ali, Tousif Osman, Mohammad Mannan and Amr Youssef.
On Privacy Risks of Public WiFi Captive Portals. Workshop on Data Privacy Management
(DPM, co-located with ESORICS 2019), September 26-27, 2019, Luxembourg.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we first present a brief overview
of hotspots and literature review of web tracking, ad injection in web content, and privacy
risks of public WiFi hotspots. In Chapter 3, we present our comprehensive analysis for
evaluating privacy risks of Canadian public WiFi captive portals, and in Chapter 4, we
present our comparative study of privacy practices of public WiFi captive portals in Europe,




Background and Related Work
This chapter covers some necessary background and literature related to this dissertation.
2.1 Background
Hotspot access is usually deployed in three forms: captive portal, direct/open-access (no
captive portals), or password-protected networks. In captive portal networks, users first
go through a captive portal session before getting internet access. The captive portal web-
page usually displays the privacy policy and/or the terms-of-service (TOS) document, along
with some advertisements, and sometimes an option to select the preferred language (for
viewing the portal content), and a social login or registration form. After accepting the
policy/TOS documents, the user’s browser is often directed to a landing page, as chosen
by the hotspot owner. The captive portal is used to make sure that guests are aware of the
hotspot privacy policy, collect personal identification information such as name and email
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for future communications, and authenticate guests if needed.
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Hotspots Privacy Risks
Several prior studies have demonstrated the possibility of eavesdropping WiFi traffic to
identify personal sensitive information in public hotspots. For example, Cheng et al. [13]
collected WiFi traffic from 20 airports in four countries, and found that two thirds of the
travelers leak private information while using airport hotspots for web browsing and smart-
phone app usage. Sombatruang et al. [54] conducted a similar study in Japan by setting up
11 experimental open public WiFi networks. The 150-hour experiment confirmed the ex-
posure of private information, including photos, email addresses, confidential documents,
and users’ credentials—transmitted via HTTP. In contrast, we analyze web tracking and
privacy leakage within WiFi captive portals and landing pages. Klasnja et al. [34] studied
privacy and security awareness of WiFi users by monitoring web traffic of 11 users. The
study shows the users’ limited understanding of risks associated with WiFi usage, and a
false sense of safety.
2.2.2 Web Tracking
Web tracking, a widespread phenomenon on the internet, is used for varying purposes, in-
cluding: targeted advertisements, identity checking, website analytics, and personalization.
Web tracking techniques can generally be categorized as stateful and stateless.
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Stateful tracking [2] is a process where third-party trackers can track users across web-
sites by storing a unique identifier in the user’s device. Modern web browsers provide
several avenues that can be used to store persistent information. Common techniques in-
clude the following:
• HTTP cookies [8] are small files stored on computers. They fall into two categories:
persistent cookies and session cookies. While persistent cookies remain on the user
device until the cookie is explicitly erased or expired, session cookies are temporary
and are erased at the end of the browsing session, upon closing the browser tab.
• Web Storage [43] can be viewed as an improvement to cookies, providing a much
greater storage capacity, without any automatic expiry. See also IndexedDB [27].
• Flash cookies [6] are stored on the user device by websites that use Adobe Flash.
Note that Adobe will stop supporting Flash at the end of 2020 [4].
Stateless tracking [21] techniques are used to generate a unique device ID based on the
combination of a wide range of user device or browser characteristics that might uniquely
identify the user device. Several browser APIs including Screen, Navigator, Canvas, or
WebGL are used for such device fingerprinting.
Eckersley [19] showed that 83.6% of the Panopticlick website [47] visitors could be
uniquely identified from a fingerprint composed of only 8 attributes. User Agent, HTTP
ACCEPT headers and if cookies were enabled; the following from JavaScript AJAX posts:
screen resolution, time zone, browser plug-ins; and from Java or Flash applet: System fonts.
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Laperdrix et al. [36] showed that AmIUnique.org can uniquely identify 89.4% of finger-
prints composed of 17 attributes, including the HTML5 canvas element and the WebGL
API. In a more recent large-scale study, Gómez-Boix et al. [25] collected over 2 million
real-world device fingerprints (composed of 17 attributes) from a top French website; they
found that only 33.6% device fingerprints are unique, raising questions on the effectiveness
of fingerprinting in the wild. Note that developing advanced fingerprinting techniques to
detect the so-called golden image (the same software and hardware as often deployed in
large enterprises), is an active research area—see e.g., [35, 52]. Several automated frame-
works have also been designed for large-scale measurement of web tracking in the wild; see
e.g., FPDetective [3] and OpenWPM [21]. In this work, we measure tracking techniques in
captive portals and landing pages, and use OpenWPM to verify the prevalence of the found
trackers on popular websites.
2.2.3 Detecting Ad Injection
Previous work has also looked into ad injection in web content, see e.g., [49, 57]. We
use similar methods for detecting potential similar content injection in hotspots since such
incidents have been reported in the past (e.g., [39, 48, 60]).
Previous work has also looked into ad injection in web content. For example, Reis et
al. [49] found that some ISPs inject advertisements and unwanted client script in traffic, by
comparing the Document Object Model (DOM) sent from a server, with the DOM received
by the user. Tsirantonakis et al. [57] showed that some open HTTP proxy servers perform
content manipulation and ad injection. They utilize two decoys websites (i.e., honeysites)
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designed with different level of complexities to identify any alteration to the honeysites
served by the proxies. We use similar methods for detecting potential content injection in
hotspots since such incidents have been reported in the past (e.g., [39, 48, 60]).
2.2.4 Analyzing Privacy Policies
A privacy policy usually discloses the service provider’s data practices. However, these
policies are often long and difficult to read. Several past studies utilize Natural Language
Processing (NLP) techniques to analyze privacy policies at scale, e.g., both Sadeh et al. [50]
and Harkous et al. [28] use NLP and machine learning techniques to extract important
privacy information from policies, and display it to a user in a friendly manner.
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Chapter 3
Our Evaluation Framework and
Analysis of Canadian Hotspots
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive privacy analysis of 67 unique public WiFi
hotspots located in Montreal, Canada, and shed light on the web tracking and data collec-
tion behaviors of these hotspots. We design a data collection framework (CPInspector)3
for both Windows and Android, and capture raw traffic traces from several public WiFi
hotspots (in Montreal, Canada) that require users to go through a captive portal before al-
lowing internet access. Our study reveals the collection of a significant amount of privacy-
sensitive personal data through the use of social login (e.g., Facebook and Google) and
registration forms, and many instances of tracking activities, sometimes even before the
user accepts the hotspot’s privacy and terms of service policies. Most hotspots use persis-
tent third-party tracking cookies within their captive portal site; these cookies can be used
3https://github.com/MadibaLab/CPInspector
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to follow the user’s browsing behavior long after the user leaves the hotspots, e.g., up to 20
years. Additionally, several hotspots explicitly share (sometimes via HTTP) the collected
personal and unique device information with many third-party tracking domains.
3.1 CPInspector for Windows
In this section, we describe CPInspector, the platform we develop for measuring captive
portal web-tracking and privacy leakages; see Figure 1 for the Windows variant. As
Android uses a special app for captive portal, we modify CPInspector accordingly; see
Sec. 3.2.
3.1.1 CPInspector Design
The main components of CPInspector include: a browser automation framework, a data mi-
gration tool and an analysis module. Selenium is used to visit the hotspot captive portal and
perform a wide range of measurements. It collects web traffic, HTTP cookies, WebStorage,
fingerprints, browsing profiles, page source code, privacy policy, and screen shots of ren-
dered pages (used to verify the data collection process). CPInspector utilizes Wireshark to
capture traffic between the instrumented browser and the hotspot access point. CPInspector
uses WebExtensions APIs4 to collect relevant data (e.g., HTTP cookies, JavaScript calls)
from the instrumented browser. Selenium is also used to isolate the test environment from
the regular user environment, ensuring that our tests remain unaffected by the user’s past
browsing behaviors. We also save a copy of the privacy policy, if available. The datasets
4https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebExtensions
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collected from the hotspots are parsed and committed to a central SQLite database. CPIn-














Figure 1: CPInspector design (Windows Setup).
Capturing traffic. We use Wireshark to capture all traffic between the instrumented
browser and the hotspot access point. We filter out traffic generated by normal activities
such as anti-virus scanning and Windows updates. Moreover, since some captive portals
adopt TLS for communication, we rely on the SSLKEYLOGFILE [29] to decrypt the TLS
traffic; we then use Tshark [61] to extract and save the HTTP requests/responses to our
database.
Identifying third-parties. We identified the corporate websites for each hotspot. Then,
we use the WHOIS registration records to identify third-party domains by comparing the
domain owner name to the hotspot corporate website owner. All evaluated hotspots have
an official website except Hvmans Cafe, where all domains are classified as third-parties.
In cases where the domain information is protected by the WHOIS privacy policy, we
visit the domain to detect any redirect to a parent site; we then lookup the parent site’s
14










registration information. If this fails, we manually review the domain’s Organization
in its TLS certificate, if available. Otherwise, we try to identify the domain owner based
on its WHOIS registration email; e.g., addthis.com is owned by Oracle as apparent from its
WHOIS email domain-contact_ww_grp@oracle.com. Next, we complement our domain-
to-company mapping using the Whotracks.me Trackers List [32]. Finally, we also use
Crunchbase [16] and Hoovers [30] to determine if the organizations are subsidiaries or
acquisitions of larger companies; e.g., instagram.com is owned by Instagram, which in
turn is owned by Facebook.
Identifying third-party trackers. We use EasyList [18], EasyPrivacy, and Fanboy to
identify known third-party trackers. EasyList identifies known advertising-related trackers,
EasyPrivacy detects known non-advertising-related trackers, and Fanboy’s list classifies
known social media related trackers. These lists rely on blacklisted script names, URLs, or
domains, which may fail to detect new trackers or variations of known trackers. For this
reason, we classify third-party trackers as follows: (a) A known tracker is a third-party that
has already been identified in the above blacklists. (b) A possible tracker is any third-party
that can potentially track the user’s browsing activities but not included in a blacklist. We
observed variations of well-known trackers such as Google Analytics, were missed by the
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blacklists (see Table 1). Throughout the thesis, we use the word “domain” to refer to the
site’s fully qualified domain name (FQDN). This definition of domain is commonly used
in many studies such as [58, 62].
Ad injection detection. Our framework also includes a module to detect modifications to
user traffic, e.g., for ad injections. We visit two decoy websites (i.e., honeysites in our con-
trol and hosted on AmazonAWS) and BBC.com, via a home network and a public hotspot,
and then compare the differences in the retrieved content (i.e., DOM trees [20]). The use
of honeysites allows us to avoid any false positive issues due to the website’s dynamic
content (e.g., dynamic ads). However, we also include a real website in our experiments
(BBC.com). The first honysite is a static web page while the second is comprised of dy-
namic content that has four fake ads that incorporates JavaScript elements, iframe tags, and
four fake ads. The fake ads were created based on source code snippets from Google Ad-
sense, Google TagManager, Taboola.com, and BuySellAds.com. We host the honeysites
through Amazon AWS and carefully mimic a realistic website.
3.1.2 Data collection
We collected a total of 679 datasets from the captive portal and landing page of 80 hotspots
(12 hotspots are measured at multiple physical locations) between September 2018 to April
2019. We stopped collecting datasets from different locations of the same chain-business
as the collected datasets were largely the same. We discarded 103 datasets due to some
errors (e.g., network failures). We analyzed over 18.5GB of collected traffic for privacy
exposure and tracking measurements, and report the results from 67 unique hotspots (576
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Table 2: List of evaluated hotspots From Montreal (Canada).
Category Count Hotspot Name
Cafe and Restaurant 19 A&W, Bombay Mahal Thali, Burger King,
Cafe Osmo, Copper Branch, Domino’s Pizza,
Harvey’s, Hvmans Cafe, Juliette Et Chocolat,
McDonald’s, Moose BAWR, Nespresso, Pizza Hut,
Pizza Pizza, Starbucks, Sushi STE-Catherine,
The Second Cup, Tim Hortons, Vua Sandwiches
Retail business 17 Canadian Tire, Dynamite, ECCO, Fossil, GAP,
Garage, H&M, Home Depot, IGA, Ikea, Laura,
Maison Simmons, Michael Kors, Roots, SAQ,
Sephora, Walmart
Shopping Mall 12 Atrium 1000, Carrefour Angrignon,
Carrefour Laval, Carrefour iA, Centre Eaton,
Centre Rockland, Complexe Desjardins,
Fairview Pointe-Claire, Mail Champlain,
Place Montreal Trust, Place Vertu,
Place Ville Marie
Bank 5 CIBC Bank, Desjardins 360, RBC Bank,
ScotiaBank, TD Bank
Art and Entertainment 4 Grevin Montreal, YMCA,
Montreal Science Centre, Place Des Arts
Transportation 3 Gare d’Autocars de Montreal, Via Rail Station,
YUL Airport
Telecom Kiosk 2 Fido, Telus
Car Rental 1 Discount Car Rental
Gymnasium 1 Nautilus Plus
Hospital 1 CHU Sainte-Justine
Hotel 1 Fairmont Hotel
Library 1 Westmount Public Library
datasets). We discuss the results in Sec. 3.1.3.
For the ad injection experiments, we collected a total of 368 datasets from crawling
the two honey websites and the BBC.com website at 98 hotspot locations. 11 hotspots are
measured at multiple physical locations. We analyzed over 8.7GB of collected traffic for ad
injection, and report the results from 87 unique hotspots (368 datasets). We did not observe
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any content modification attempts.
3.1.3 Analysis and Results
In this section, we present the results of our analysis on collected personal information,
privacy leaks, web trackers, HTTP cookies, and fingerprinting, and the effectiveness of two
anti-tracking extensions and private browsing mode.
3.1.3.1 Personal Information Collection, Sharing, and Leaking
Personal identifiable information (PII) collection. Most hotspots (40; 59.7%) allow
internet access without seeking any explicit personal data. The remaining 27 (40.3%)
hotspots use social login (Facebook, LinkedIn, Google, Instagram) , or a registration page
to collect significant amount of personal information; 19 (28.4%) of these hotspots man-
date social login or user registration, see Table 3. For instance, the Hvmans Cafe hotspot
reads the user’s profile information and media from Instagram (See Figure 9 in Appendix B
for an example). The profile may include: the user’s email address, mobile phone number,
user ID, full name, gender, biography, website, and profile picture. Moreover, LinkedIn
shares the user’s full name, email address, profile picture, LinkedIn headlines, current em-
ployment, and basic profile (See Figure 8 in Appendix B for an example). The basic profile
consists of a large list of PII items, including full employment history, and the current
location [40].
Sharing with third-parties. Most hotspots share personal information and browser/device
5In November 2018, we found that Roots was using Yelp WiFi with mandatory personal data collection,
but as of April 2019, they now use Cisco that requires no PII.
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Table 3: Personal information collected via social login, registration, or optional sur-
veys. The “Powered By” column refers to third-parties that provide hotspot services (when
used/identified). F refers to Facebook, L: LinkedIn, I: Instagram, G: Google, T: Twitter,
R: registration form, and S: survey; *: personal information is mandatory to access the
service.
























































































































Bombay Mahal Thali* Sy5 FR FR F F
Carrefour Laval* Aislelabs FR FR FR F F F F F
Fairview Pointe-Claire* Aislelabs FR FRT FR F F F F F T T
Carrefour Angrignon Eye-In FGL FGL FGL L L L
Centre Eaton Eye-In F F F
Centre Rockland Eye-In FL FL FL L L L





Grevin Montreal Eye-In FL FL F FL L L S S L
Harvey’s* Colony Networks F FR F
Hvmans Cafe* Purple FR FR F F F F I I
Mail Champlain Eye-In FL FL FL L L L
Maison Simmon* R
Michael Kors* Purple R R R R R R
Montreal Science Centre* Telus R
Moose BAWR* Sticky WiFi R
Nautilus Plus* R
Nespresso* Orange R
Place Montreal Trust R R R
Roots*5 Yelp WiFi R R
Telus* R
Sushi STE-Catherine* MyWiFi R
Vua Sandwiches* Coolblue FR FR R F
YUL Airport* Datavalet FL FRL FL L L L
information with third-parties via the referrer header, the request-URL, HTTP cookie or
WebStorage (for examples, see Table 4 which provides examples from our datasets for
these four types of leakage).
We identified 40 hotspots (59.7%) that use third-party captive portals where they share
personal information, including 18 (26.9%) share email address; 15 (22.4%) share user’s
full name; 12 (17.9%) share profile picture; 5 (7.5%) share birthday, current city, current
employment and LinkedIn headline; see Table 3. We also found some captive portals leak
19
Table 4: Examples of MAC address leakage to third-parties via different methods. URL
query strings are truncated for brevity.
(1) Leaks via Request URL
GET collect?..=HTTP://ca..&client_mac=02:21:5a:4f:d4:49
Host: www.google-analytics.com




(3) Leaks by HTTP Cookie
Host: msn.com
Cookie: _cb_svref=HTTP://68.67.41.214:8880/... id=02:16:76:70:d4:07
(4) Leaks by Web Storage
Host: optimizely.com
localstorage: visitor_profile=hReferer:HTTP://../id=02:16:76:70:d4:16
device/browser information to third-parties, including 40 (59.7%) leak MAC address and
last visited site; 18 (26.9%) leak screen resolution; 26 (38.8%) leak user agent; 24 (35.8%)
leak browser Information and language; and 15 (22.4%) leak plugins. Moreover, some
hotspots leak the MAC address to third-parties, e.g., Pizza Hut to 11 domains, and H&M,
Place Montreal Trust and Discount Car Rental to six domains each. Top organizations that
receive the MAC addresses include: Network-auth.com from 21 hotspots, Alphabet 18,
Openh264.org 12, Facebook 10, Datavalet 8, and Amazon 6.
PII leaks via HTTP. We search for personal information of our used accounts in the col-
lected HTTP traffic, and record the leaked information, including the HTTP request URL,
and source (captive portal vs. landing page). Three hotspots transmit the user’s full name
via HTTP (Place Montreal Trust, Nautilus Plus and Roots). In Place Montreal Trust, the
user’s full name is saved in a cookie (valid for five years), and each time the user con-
nects to the captive portal, the cookie is automatically transmitted via HTTP. Moreover,
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three hotspots leak the user’s email address via HTTP (Dynamite, Roots, and Garage). In
Nautilus Plus, a user must enter her membership number in the captive portal. For par-
tially entered membership numbers, the captive portal verifies the identity by displaying
personal information of five people in a scrambled way (first and last names, postal codes,
ages, dates of birth, and phone numbers), over HTTP. The user then chooses the right com-
bination corresponding to her personal information. We also confirmed that some of this
data belongs to real people by authenticating to this hotspot using ten randomly generated
partial membership numbers. Then, we used the reverse lookup in canada411.ca to confirm
the correlation between the returned phone numbers, names, and addresses.
3.1.3.2 Presence of Third-Party Tracking Domains and HTTP Cookies
Tracking domains. We detect third-party tracking domains using: EasyList, EasyPrivacy,
and Fanboy’s List—downloaded on September 2018. On average, each captive portal hosts
7.4 third-party tracking domains (max: 34 domains, including 10 known trackers); see
Figure 3.2(a). We noticed that the hotspots that use the same third-party captive portal still
have a different number of third-parties. For example, for the Datavalet hotspots (YUL
Airport, McDonald’s, Starbucks, Via Rail Station, Tim Hortons, CIBC Bank, Place Vertu),
the number of third-parties are 22, 16, 10, 8, 5, 5, and 2 respectively. The hotspots (46;
68.7%) that redirect users to their corporate websites, host more known third-party tracking
domains—on average, 30.6 domains per landing page; see Figure 3.2(b). We also analyze
the organizations with the highest known-tracker representations. We group domains by
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(b) Landing pages
Figure 2: Number of third-party domains on captive portals and landing pages (top 20).
For example, Hvmans Cafe captive portal hosts a total of 34 tracking domains, including
7 known trackers. Note that for all reported tracking/domain statistics, we accumulate
the distinct tracking domains as observed in all the datasets collected for a given hotspot
(e.g., from both browsers and for different social logins, if required). For list of evaluated
hotspots see Table 2.
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are present on over 10% of the captive portals. Alphabet and Facebook are also present on
over 50% of the landing pages.
HTTP tracking cookies on captive portals. We found 40 (59.7%) hotspots create third-
party cookies valid for various duration—e.g., over 5 years from 10 (14.9%) hotspots, six
months to five years from 23 (34.3%) hotspots, and under six months from 38 (56.7%)
hotspots; see Figure 3.3(a). Via Rail Station, Fairview Pointe-Claire, Carrefour Laval,
Roots, McDonald’s, Tim Hortons, and Harvey’s have a third-party cookie from network-
auth.com, valid for 20 years. Moreover, YUL Airport, Via Rail Station, Complexe Des-
jardins, McDonald’s, Starbucks, Tim Hortons, CIBC Bank have a common 1-year valid
cookie from Datavalet, except for CIBC (17 days). This cookie uniquely identifies a device
based on the MAC address (set to the same value unless the MAC address is spoofed).
Some hotspots save the MAC address in HTTP cookies, including CHU Sainte-Justine,
Moose BAWR, and Centre Rockland. Refer to Table A for the list of cookies that are valid
for more than five years.
We also analyze first-party cookies on captive portals; see Figure 3.3(b). 22 (32.8%)
hotspots create first-party cookies valid for various durations; 14 (20.9%) hotspots include
cookies valid for periods ranging from six months to five years, and 17 (25.4%) hotspots
for less than 6 months. Place Montreal Trust saves the user’s full name in a first-party
cookie valid for five years; this cookie is transmitted via HTTP. Finally, we analyze hotspots
that create persistent cookies before explicit consent from the user, we found 26 (38.8%)
hotspots create cookies that are valid for periods varying from 30 minutes to a year, includ-
ing Domino’s Pizza, Fido, GAP, H&M, McDonald’s, Roots, Starbucks, and Tim Hortons.
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Duration < 180 days Duration between 180 days and 5 years Duration > 5 years
(b) First-party cookies
Figure 3: Number of third-party and first-party cookies on captive portals (top 20). Note
that for all reported cookies/domain statistics, we accumulate the distinct cookies as ob-
served in all the datasets collected for a given hotspot. We consider a cookie as a potential








































































































Duration < 180 days Duration between 180 days and 5 years Duration > 5 years
(b) First-party cookies
Figure 4: Number of third-party and first-party cookies on landing pages (top 20). Note that
for all reported cookies/domain statistics, we accumulate the distinct cookies as observed
in all the datasets collected for a given hotspot. We consider a cookie as a potential tracking
cookie if the cookie is persistent (i.e., session cookies are ignored).
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HTTP tracking cookies on landing pages. We found 48 (71.6%) hotspots create third-
party cookies valid for various durations—e.g., over 5 years from 4 (6.0%) hotspots, six
months to five years from 47 (70.1%) hotspots, and under six months from 42 (62.7%)
hotspots, see Figure 3.4(a). Prominent examples include the following. Fossil has a 25-
year valid cookie from pbbl.com; CIBC Bank has two 5-year valid cookies from stackadapt.
com, a known tracker. We also analyze the first-party cookies on landing pages; see Fig-
ure 3.4(b). 42 (62.7%) hotspots create first-party cookies valid for various durations—e.g.,
over 5 years from 10 (14.9%) hotspots, six months to five years from 42 (62.7%) hotspots,
and under six months from 41 (61.2%) hotspots. Notable examples: Fossil has a 99-year
valid cookie, Fido has three cookies valid for 68–81 years, CHU Sainte-Justine has a 20-
year valid cookie, CIBC Bank has a 19-year cookie, and Walmart has four cookies valid
for 9–20 years.
3.1.3.3 Device and Browser Fingerprinting
We analyze fingerprinting attempts in captive portals and landing pages. We use Don’t
FingerPrint Me (DFPM [33]) for detecting known fingerprinting techniques, including the
screen object, navigator object, WebRTC, Font, WebGL, Canvas, AudioContext, and Bat-
tery Status [21, 41, 44, 46]. We use attribute and API interchangeably, when referring to
fingerprinting JavaScript APIs.
Captive portal. 24 (35.8%) hotspots perform some form of fingerprinting. On average,
each captive portal uses 5.9 attributes (max: 47 attributes, including 35 Navigator, 6 Screen,
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(b) Landing pages
Figure 5: Number of fingerprinting APIs on captive portals and landing pages (top 20).
Note that for all fingerprinting statistics, we accumulate the distinct APIs as observed in all
the datasets collected for a given hotspot.
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fingerprint user device/browser before explicit consent from the user, including GAP, Mc-
Donald’s, and Place Montreal Trust, using 6–46 attributes. Moreover, 46 (68.7%) hotspots
fingerprint MAC addresses.
Landing pages. 51 (76.1%) hotspots perform fingerprinting on their landing pages. On
average, each landing page fingerprints 19.4 attributes (max: 117 attributes, including 49
Navigator, 9 Screen, 2 Canvas, 3 WebRTC, 50 WebGL, 1 AudioContext, 1 Worker and 2
Battery Status); see Figure 3.5(b). Prominent examples include the following. Discount
Car Rental includes script from Sizmek Technologies Inc., which uses a total of 67 APIs
(48 WebGL, 12 Navigator, five Screen, and two Canvas APIs). Manual analysis also re-
veals Font fingerprinting via side-channel inference [44]; this script is also highly similar to
FingerprintJS [59]. Discount Car Rental also uses script from Integral Ad Science, which
uses 41 attributes, including: 31 Navigator, seven Screen APIs, two WebRTC, and one Au-
dioContext (cf. [21]). The navigator APIs are used to collect attributes such as the USB
gamepad controllers, and list MIDI input and output devices. H&M and Home Depot host
the same JavaScript that collects 42 attributes, including 34 Navigator, six Screen, and two
Canvas APIs. Laura has a script from PerimeterX that collects 27 attributes, including 21
Navigator and 6 Screen APIs; code manual analysis reveals WebGL and Canvas finger-
printing.
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3.2 CPInspector for Android
In contrast to Windows, Android OS handles captive portals with a dedicated application.
The Android Developers documentation and Android Source documentation omit details
of how Android handles captive portals. Here we briefly document the inner working
of Android captive portals, and discuss our preliminary findings, specifically on tracking
cookies on Android devices.
3.2.1 Android Captive Portal Login App
Using Android ps (Process Status), we observe that a new process named
com.android.captiveportallogin appears whenever the captive portal is
launched. The Manifest file for CaptivePortalLogin explicitly defines that its activity class
will receive all captive portal broadcasts by any application installed on the OS and handle
the captive portal. We observe that files in the data folder of this application are populated
and altered during a captive portal session; we collect these files from our tests.
3.2.2 Capturing Network Traffic
To capture traffic from Android apps, several readily-available VPN apps from Google Play
can be used (e.g., Packet Capture, NetCapture, NetKeeper). However, Android does not use
VPN for captive portals. On the other hand, using an MITM Proxy server such as mitm-
proxy (https://mitmproxy.org/) requires the server to run on a desktop environment, which
would make the internet traffic come out of the desktop OS, i.e., the mobile device would
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not be visible to the hotspot. To overcome this, we set up a virtual Linux environment
within the Android OS by using Linux Deploy (https://github.com/meefik/linuxdeploy),
enabling us to run Linux desktop applications within Android with access to the core com-
ponent of Android OS, e.g., Android OS processes, network interfaces, etc. We use Debian
and mitmproxy on the virtual environment, and configure Android’s network settings to
proxy all the traffic going through the WiFi adapter to the mitmproxy server. The proxy
provides us the shared session keys established with a destination server, enabling us to
decrypt HTTPS traffic. We use tcpdump to capture the network traffic.
3.2.3 Data Collection and Analysis
We visited 22 hotspots and collect network traffic from their captive portals. First, we clear
the data and cache of the CaptivePortalLogin app and collect data from a given hotspot.
Next, we change the MAC address of our test devices (Google Pixel 3 with Android 9 and
Nexus 4 with Android 5.1.1) and collect data again without clearing the data and cache.
From the proxy’s request packets, we confirm that the browser agent correctly reflects our
test devices, and the traffic is being originated from the CaptivePortalLogin app. Next, we
analyze the data extracted from the app. The structure of the data directory is similar to
Google Chrome on Android. We locate the .\app_webview\Cookies SQLite file in
the data directory, storing the CaptivePortalLogin app’s cookies.
We observe that 9 out of 22 hotspots store persistent cookies in the captive portal app;




































Duration < 180 days Duration between 180 days and 5 years Duration > 5 years
Figure 6: Number of cookies stored on the Android captive portal app. We consider a
cookie as a potential tracking cookie if the cookie is persistent (i.e., session cookies are
ignored).
leaves the hotspot. Instead, the cookies remain active as set in their validity periods, al-
though they are unavailable to the regular browser apps. Prominent examples include: Tim
Hortons inserts a 20-year valid cookie from network-auth.com, and Hvmans Cafe stores
a 10-year valid cookie from Instagram. In the captive portal traffic, we confirm that these
cookies are indeed present and shared in subsequent visits, and follow the Same-Origin
Policy. Hotspots can use these cookies to uniquely identify and authenticate user devices
even when the device MAC address is dynamically changed; Tim Hortons hotspot uses
its cookies for authentication. However, McDonald’s did not authenticate the device even
though the cookies were present but the MAC address was new.
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3.3 Privacy Policy and Anti-Tracking
3.3.1 Privacy Policy
We performed a preliminary manual analysis of privacy policy and TOS documents from
hotspots that appear to be most risky. Roots states clearly in their privacy policy that they
use SSL to protect PII, but their captive portal transmits a user’s full name and email address
via HTTP. Place Montreal Trust transmits the user’s full name via HTTP, and they explic-
itly state that transmission of information over the public networks cannot be guaranteed to
be 100% secure. Nautilus Plus has a very basic TOS that omits important information such
as the laws they comply with and privacy implications of using their hotspot. They state
clearly that the assurance of confidentiality of the user’s information is of great concern
to Nautilus Plus, but they use HTTP for all communications, leaking personal information
while they attempt to verify the customer’s identity; see Sec. 3.1.3.1. Their privacy policy
is also inaccessible from the captive portal and omits any reference to WiFi. Dynamite
and Garage are two brands of Groupe Dynamite. They transmit the user’s email address
via HTTP despite claiming to use SSL. Their privacy policy is inaccessible from the cap-
tive portal and omits any reference to the WiFi. GAP explicitly mentions their collection
of browser/device information, and they indeed collect 46 such attributes, before the user
accepts the hotspot’s policies.
Although McDonald’s tracks users in their captive portal (9 known trackers, 28 fin-
gerprinting attributes), the captive portal itself lacks a privacy policy stating their use of
web tracking. Carrefour Laval and Fairview Pointe-Claire perform cross device tracking
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by participating in the Device Co-op [5], where they may collect and share information
about devices linked to the user. Two hotspots link the user’s MAC address to the collected
personal information, including Roots, and Bombay Mahal Thali. Sharing the harvested
personal data with subsidiaries and third-party affiliates is also the norm. We found 34
(50.7%) hotspots have a TOS document but lack a privacy policy on their captive portal,
including TD Bank, and Burger King. Three hotspots lack both the privacy policy and TOS
document on their captive portals, including Laura, ECCO, and Maison Simmons.
3.3.2 The Same Hotspot Captive Portal in Different Physical Loca-
tions
12 hotspots are measured at multiple physical locations. We stopped collecting datasets
from different locations of the same chain-business as the collected datasets were largely
the same. We provide an example where some minor differences occur: Starbucks’ captive
portal domain varies in the two evaluated locations (am.datavalet.io vs. sbux-j2.datavalet.
io). However, the number of known trackers remained the same, while the number of third-
parties increased by one domain. Moreover, the -sf-device cookie validity increased
from 17 days to 1 year, and the -sf-landing cookie was not created in the second
location.
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3.3.3 Effectiveness of Privacy Extensions and Private Browsing
To evaluate the effectiveness anti-tracking solutions against hotspot trackers, we collect
traffic from both Chrome and Firefox in private browsing modes, and by enabling Adblock
Plus, and Privacy Badger extensions—leading to a total of six datasets for each hotspot.
Then, we use the EasyList, EasyPrivacy, and Fanboy’s lists to determine whether known
trackers remain in the collected datasets; see Table 5. We only count the domain name of a
tracker or advertiser when a request was sent, or a cookie was created.
Table 5: The number of unique known trackers not blocked by our anti-tracking solutions.
W/O Ad Blockers AdBlock Plus Privacy Badger Private Browsing
Firefox 382 33 180 315
Chrome 488 117 212 356
3.3.4 Hotspot Trackers in the Wild
We measured the prevalence of trackers found in captive portals and landing pages, in
popular websites—to understand the reach and consequences of hotspot trackers. We use
OpenWPM [21] between February 28–March 15, 2019 to automatically browse the home
pages of the top 143k Tranco domains [37] as of February 27, 2019. We extract the tracking
persistent cookie domains from captive portals or landing pages; we define such cookies to
have validity ≥ 1 day and the sum of the value lengths from all the cookies from the same
third-party website longer than 35 characters—cf. [11]. Then, we counted those tracking
domains in the OpenWPM database; see Table 6. For example, the doubleclick.net cookie
as found in 4 captive portals and 30 landing pages, appears 160,508 times in the top 143k
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Tranco domains (mutiple times in some domains). Overall, hotspot users can be tracked
across websites, even long time after the user has left a hotspot.
Table 6: Count of tracking domains from captive portals and landing pages in Tranco
domains 143k home pages (top 10).
Captive Portal Landing Page
Tracker Count Tracker Count
doubleclick.net 160508 pubmatic.com 326991
linkedin.com 48726 rubiconproject.com 257643
facebook.com 37107 doubleclick.net 160508
twitter.com 14874 casalemedia.com 131626
google.com 13676 adsrvr.org 116438
atdmt.com 5198 addthis.com 83221
instagram.com 3466 demdex.net 83160
gap.com 295 contextweb.com 82965
maxmind.com 294 rlcdn.com 75295
gapcanada.ca 64 livechatinc.com 69919
3.4 Summary of Results
We collected a total of 679 datasets from the captive portals and landing pages of 80
hotspot locations between September 2018 to April 2019. 103 datasets were discarded due
to some errors (e.g., network failure). We analyzed over 18.5GB of collected traffic for pri-
vacy exposure and tracking, and report the results from 67 unique hotspots (576 datasets),
making this the largest such study to characterize hotspots in terms of their privacy risks.
Our hotspots include cafes and restaurants, shopping malls, retail businesses, banks, and
transportation companies (bus, train and airport), some of which are local to Montreal, but
many are national and international brands. 40 hotspots (59.7%) use third-party captive
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portals that appear to have many other business customers across Canada and elsewhere.
Thus, our results might be applicable to a larger geographical scope. We discuss the main
findings of our privacy analysis of public WiFi captive portals along five axis:
Data collection. 27 hotspots (40.3%) use social login or a registration page to collect
personal information (19 hotspots make this process mandatory for internet access). Social
login providers may share several privacy-sensitive PII items—e.g., we found that LinkedIn
shares the user’s full name, email address, profile picture, full employment history, and the
current location.
User tracking. Except three, all hotspots employ varying levels of user tracking tech-
nologies on their captive portals and landing pages. On average, we found 7.4 third-party
tracking domains per captive portal (max: 34 domains). We also found that 40 hotspots
(59.7%) create persistent third-party tracking HTTP cookies (validity up to 20 years); 4.2
cookies on average on each captive portal (max: 34 cookies). Surprisingly, 26 hotspots
(38.8%) create persistent cookies even before getting user consent on their privacy/TOS
document. Furthermore, two hotspots (3.0%) state in their privacy policies that they ex-
plicitly link the user’s MAC address to the collected PII, allowing long-term user tracking,
especially for desktop OSes with fixed MAC. Note that sharing the harvested data with
subsidiaries and third-party affiliates is the norm.
From our Android experiments, we reveal that 9 out of 22 hotspots can effectively track
Android devices even though Android uses a separate captive portal app and randomizes
MAC address as visible to the hotspot.
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Data sharing and privacy leaks. Several hotspots explicitly share (sometimes even with-
out HTTPS) personal and unique device information with many third-party domains. 40
hotspots (59.7%) expose the user’s device MAC address; five hotspots leak PII via HTTP,
including the user’s full name, email address, phone number, address, postal code, date of
birth, and age (despite some of them claiming to use TLS for communicating such informa-
tion). Two hotspots appear to perform cross-device tracking via Adobe Marketing Cloud
Co-op [5].
Ad/content injection. We also design a framework to detect ad/content injection by
hotspots. We collected over 8.7GB traffic (346 datasets) by crawling two honey websites
and BBC.com from 98 hotspots (hotspots without captive portals are also included). We
did not observe any content modification attempts.
3.5 Conclusion
Public WiFi hotspots are growing in popularity across the globe. Most users frequently
connect to hotspots due to their free-of-cost service. This motivates companies to use ad-
vertising and tracking services on their public WiFi captive portals and landing pages to
understand customers interests, behaviors, and in some cases monetize those hotspots. In
this chapter, we perform a comprehensive analysis of web tracking and data collection be-
haviors of public WiFi hotspots in Montreal, Canada. Our analysis reveals that the majority
of hotspots employ varying levels of user tracking technologies on their captive portals and
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landing pages. We identify noticeable data collection through the use of social login (e.g.,
Facebook and Google) and registration forms. We also demonstrate that several hotspots
explicitly share (sometimes via HTTP) the collected personal and unique device informa-
tion with many third-party tracking domains. In fact, more than half of hotspots use third-
party captive portals that appear to have many other business customers across Canada and
elsewhere. Thus our results might be applicable to a larger geographical scope.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of Worldwide Hotspots
In Chapter 3, we analyzed tracking behaviors and privacy leakage in WiFi captive portals
and landing pages of 80 hotspot locations (in Quebec, Canada) between September 2018 to
April 2019. We reveal the collection of a significant amount of privacy-sensitive personal
data through the use of social login (e.g., Facebook and Google) and registration forms, and
many instances of tracking activities, sometimes even before the user accepts the hotspot’s
privacy and terms of service policies. In this chapter, we collected a total of 130 datasets
from the captive portal and landing page of 112 hotspots locations in Ontario (39; Canada),
Luxembourg (43; Europe), Netherlands (3; Europe), France (2; Europe), and New York
(25, USA) between July 2019 to October 2019. Our main objective is to perform a high-
level comparison of privacy practices between Canadian, European, and the US hotspots.
Our analysis reveals that most hotspots use varying levels of third-party trackers on public
WiFi captive portals in the three regions. We also found that more than half of hotspots use
third-party captive portals result in sharing the harvested data with third-party entities.
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4.1 Methodology
Our main objective here is to perform a high-level comparison of privacy practices be-
tween Canadian, European, and the US hotspots, including the use of third-party trackers,
and sharing harvested data with third-party entities through the use of third-party captive
portals. Our methodology remains mostly the same as Chapter 3. We benefit from the
lessons learned from our study on Canadian hotspots. We streamline some of the cases of
data collection that did not produce significant results. From each hotspot, we collect traffic
using Chrome on Windows. We stop collecting datasets from Firefox as the datasets we
collected previously (Chapter 3) were largely the same. We also stop collecting datasets in
private browsing, ad-blockers, and Android as the focus in this phase is to compare tracking
behaviors between hotspots in Europe, Canada, and the US. In order to perform an apple-to-
apple comparison, we only include the previously collected data using the Chrome browser
in regular browsing mode from Quebec, Canada in this chapter.
4.2 Data Collection
We conduct two phases of data collections from public WiFi hotspots. In Chapter 3, we
collected a total of 679 datasets from the captive portal and landing page of 80 hotspot
locations in Quebec, Canada between September 2018 to April 2019. We analyzed the
collected traffic for privacy exposure and tracking, and report the results from 67 unique
hotspots. In this chapter, we collected a total of 130 datasets from the captive portal and
landing page of 112 hotspots locations in Ontario (39; Canada), Luxembourg (43; Europe),
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Netherlands (3; Europe), France (2; Europe), and New York (25, USA) between July 2019
to October 2019.6 In total, we tested the captive portal and landing page of 80 hotspot
locations between September 2018 to October 2019 from Europe, Canada, and the US.
For summary of the total number of evaluated hotspots in each region, see Table 7. The
complete list of evaluated hotspots (including Quebec) is available in Appendix C.
Table 7: List (count) of evaluated hotspots in Europe, Canada, and the US.
Region # Locations # Unique hotspots # Locations per sub region
Canada 119 100 Ontario (39) and Quebec (80)
Europe 48 47 Luxembourg (43), France (2), and Netherlands (3)
US 25 25 New York (25)
4.3 Analysis and Results
4.3.1 Finding the Captive Portal Operator
Our objective is to understand companies involved in the hotspots tracking and data collec-
tion in public WiFi hotspots. First, we identified each hotspot captive portal URL. Then,
we use the WHOIS registration records to identify the domain owner name. In cases where
the domain information is protected by the WHOIS privacy policy, we visit the domain to
detect any redirect to a parent site; we then lookup the parent site’s registration informa-
tion. If this fails, we manually review the domain’s Organization in its TLS certificate, if
6From each hotspot, we collect traffic using Chrome on Windows. We stopped collecting datasets from
Firefox as the collected datasets were largely the same. We also stopped collecting datasets in private brows-
ing, ad-blockers, and Android as the focus in this phase is to compare tracking behaviors between hotspots in
Europe, Canada, and the US.
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available. Otherwise, we try to identify the domain owner based on its WHOIS registra-
tion email; e.g., globalsuite.net is owned by Guest-Tek as apparent from its WHOIS email
production@guest-tek.com. If the captive portal’s owner cannot be identified, we use the
captive portal URL’s “public suffix + 1” [42] as the company owner. We found the operators
for five hotspots (Andersons, Brochettes et Cie, Bombay Mahal Thali, Subway and Ernster)
from the “Powered by” message that appear on their captive portal as TP-Link, WiiZone,
Sy5, AirTight Networks and MixVOIP, respectively. Finally, we also use Crunchbase [16]
to determine if the organizations are subsidiaries or acquisitions of larger companies; e.g.,
carrols.com is owned by Carrols Corporation, which in turn is owned by Bridgepoint (the
parent company of Burger King Corporation). The combination of these methods helped
us to accurately find 71 companies owning the captive portal of 141 hotspots. We could
not find company information for 46.3% (31 hotspots) of the public WiFi hotspot captive
portals in our dataset. Throughout the chapter we use the word “Operator” to refer to the
captive portal owner.
4.3.2 Third-Party Captive Portals
Table 8 compares the number of hotspots that use a third-party captive portal in our dataset.
As depicted in the table, third-party captive portals are commonly used in many Canadian,
European, and the US hotspots. Around 64% of Canadian/European hotspots and 56% of
the US hotspots use a third-party captive portal. In total, we identified 108 hotspots (62.8%)
that use third-party captive portals in our dataset of the three regions.
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# Unique hotspots 100 47 25 4 4 1 1
# Hotspots operators 52 34 20 3 5 1 1
# Hotspots w 3rd-party captive portals 64 30 14 - - - -
% Hotspots w 3rd-party captive portals 64.0% 63.8% 56.0% - - - -
4.3.3 Hotspots Operators
Table 9: List of captive portal operators grouped by their parent company (top 15).
Company # hotspots Region Hotspots [max. 3]
Cisco 24 CA, US, EU M&T Bank, NBC bank, YMCA
Datavalet 12 CA McDonald’s, Tim Hortons, Starbucks
H&M 7 CA, EU H&M, Arket, COS
Eye-In 5 CA Centre Eaton, Grevin Montreal, Mail Champlain
Aislelabs 4 CA Carrefour Laval, Rideau Centre, South St. Burger
Cloudflare 4 CA, US Atrium 1000, Place Ville Marie, Maid of the Mist
Cloudi-Fi 4 EU CHANEL, Cloche d’Or, Gucci
Purple 4 CA Hvmans Cafe, Walmart, Michael Kors
Bridgepoint 3 CA, US Burger King(CA), Burger King(US), Tim Hortons (US)
TELUS 3 EU Telus(Quebec), Telus(Ontario), Montreal Science Centre
Hotspot System 3 EU KIKI, Rock Box, Zulu
AT&T 2 CA, US Home Depot, McDonald’s
Facebook 2 US, CA Tinder Box, NYX
Dynamite 2 CA Dynamite, Garage
GAP 2 CA GAP(Quebec), GAP(Ontario)
Table 9 shows the top 20 organizations that operate hotspot captive portals. Cisco delivers
14.0% (24) of hotspot services for the three regions. If we look at each region, we find that
Cisco operates 2 (4.3%), 17 (17.0%) and 5 (20.0%) hotspots in Europe, and Canada and the
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US, respectively. For instance, Cisco operates Bayshore (Canada), Barnes & Noble (US),
and MAC cosmetics (Europe).
4.3.4 Operators of Common Hotspots
Table 10: List of common hotspots in the three regions showing the operator in each region.
Hotspot Canada Europe US
Burger King Bridgepoint Win Bridgepoint
McDonald’s Datavalet AT&T
H&M H&M Clothing Company H&M Clothing Company
Starbucks Datavalet GlobalReach Technology
Tim Hortons Datavalet Bridgepoint
Pizza Hut pizzahut.ca 172.16.28.1
ONroute HMSHost
MAC Cosmetics Cisco Cisco
Table 11: List of common hotspots in Quebec and Ontario showing the operators.
Hotspot Quebec Ontario
A&W Restaurants Yum! Brands Yum! Brands
Fido Cisco Cisco
GAP Gap, Inc. Gap, Inc.
H&M H&M Clothing Company H&M Clothing Company
Laura Cisco Cisco
McDonald’s Datavalet Datavalet
Roots Yelp WiFi7, Cisco Cisco
Sephora Sephora Sephora
Starbucks Datavalet Datavalet
TD Bank Toronto Dominion Bank Group Toronto Dominion Bank Group
Telus TELUS Corporation TELUS Corporation
The Second Cup The Second Cup The Second Cup
Tim Hortons Datavalet Datavalet
Walmart Purple Purple
7In November 2018, we found that Roots was using Yelp WiFi, but as of April 2019, they now use Cisco
in both Ontario and Quebec hotspots.
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In Table 10, we analyze the captive portal operator of public WiFi hotspots that have
branches in multiple regions. We notice that hotspots sometimes use the same captive
portal operator in their different branches. For example, MAC cosmetics uses a captive
portal owned by Cisco in their Canadian and European hotspots. We can also see that
Burger King uses captive portal from Bridgepoint in the US and Canada while Win (win.be)
provides the service in Europe. In contrast, McDonald’s, Starbucks, and Tim Hortons
are common hotspots between Canada and the US. However, Datavalet owns the three
hotspots’ captive portals in Canada. In the US, AT&T owns McDonald’s captive portal;
GlobalReach Technology owns Starbucks captive portal; and Bridgepoint owns the Tim
Hortons captive portal. Moreover, in Table 11, we analyze the Canadian hotspots that have
branches in different regions in Canada (Quebec and Ontario). Our analysis reveals that all
the 14 hotspots have the same operators in their Quebec and in Ontario branches.
4.3.5 Presence of Third-Party Tracking Domains on Captive Portals
In this section, we conduct a high-level comparison of first and third-party domains present
on captive portals of Canadian hotspots with those present on captive portals of European
and the US hotspots, see Table 12. This comparative analysis uncovers differences in the
third-party domains that appear in the three regions. In aggregated terms, we found 45
unique known trackers (FQDNs) in our set of Canadian hotspots but only 21 and 18 in
the European and the US hotspots, respectively. However, when looking specifically at
the percentage of known trackers, we see that they are slightly more diverse in the US
hotspots (32.14%) but only 22.72% and 18.75% in the Canadian and European hotspots,
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respectively. The intersection between the unique third-party domains (FQDNs) is also
low. Only 12 common third-party domains are presents on the captive portal in the three
regions. However, our analysis reveals that on average, each captive portal hosts 5.37,
4.34, and 3.84 third-party tracking domains in Canada, Europe and the US, respectively.
The statistics of known trackers reflect only a lower estimate of the presence of third-party
trackers on captive portals because of the limitations of EasyList and EasyPrivacy blacklists
in detecting new trackers or variations of known trackers [1, 51, 53].


















































# Unique hotspots 968 47 25 4 4 1 1
# Unique domains 312 152 91 32 25 12 12
# Unique first-parties 114 40 35 2 2 0 0
# Unique third-parties 198 112 56 30 23 12 12
# Unique known trackers 45 21 18 7 11 3 3
% Unique known trackers 22.72 18.75 32.14 - - - -
Avg third-party trackers 5.4 4.34 3.84 - - - -
Avg known trackers 1.1 0.72 0.8 - - - -
8In order to perform an apple-to-apple comparison, we only include the previously collected data using
the Chrome browser in regular browsing mode from Quebec, Canada in this study. This reduces the total
number of evaluated unique Canadian hotspots in this chapter from 100 to 96 due to technical errors
collecting Chrome datasets for four hotpots in Quebec, including CHU Sainte-Justine, Sushi STE-Catherine,
The Second Cup, and Westmount Public Library.
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We also analyze the first-party in the captive portals. In our analysis, we found no
common first-party domains among the three regions. However, two domains are com-
mon between Canada and Europe (splashpage.hm.com and hm.com) which represent the
captive portal and landing page domains of the H&M hotspots in the two regions. We
also found two domains that are common between Canada and the US (McDonalds.com
and timhortons.com) which appear on the landing pages of McDonald’s and Tim Hortons
hotspots, respectively.
Note that for all reported unique domains/first-parties/third-parties/known trackers in
Table 12, we accumulate the distinct domains/first-parties/third-parties/known trackers as
observed in all the datasets collected for a given region.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyze the privacy of Public WiFi captive portals from different regions:
Canada, Europe, and the US. We reveal the use of varying level of third-party trackers on
their public WiFi captive portals. We also found the use of third-party captive portal is the
norm which results in sharing the harvested data with third-party entities. We also found
that some companies operate in the three regions which allows user tracking across coun-
tries/continents. This pose some unique risks due to the hotspot access to the users’ foot




Analysis of Canadian Hotspots’ Privacy
Policies
In Chapter 3, we analyzed tracking behaviors and privacy leakage in WiFi captive por-
tals and landing pages of 80 hotspot locations (in Montreal, Canada) between September
2018 to April 2019. In this chapter, we analyze hotspots privacy policies and terms-of-use
documentation which also discloses the service provider’s data and privacy practices. We
use our collected hotspots’ datasets to validate some of those privacy practices, including
data collection, secure data transfer, data storage location, and data sharing. The results
presented in Chapter 3 reveal the collection of a significant amount of privacy-sensitive
personal data through the use of social login (e.g., Facebook and Google) and registration
forms. Several hotspots explicitly share (sometimes via HTTP) the collected personal and
unique device information with many third-party tracking domains. In this chapter, we
evaluated a sample of 16 privacy policy and TOS documents from hotspots that appear
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to be most risky in Montreal, Canada; Table 13 summarizes the results of our analysis.
Briefly, in this chapter, we propose a group of criteria to analyze various privacy aspects in
hotspots and we use our collected hotspots’ datasets to validate selected privacy aspects of
the public WiFi.
5.1 Privacy Policy Evaluation Framework
In this section, we outline a group of criteria that are representative of various privacy
aspects in hotspots. The criteria we explore consist of five categories: privacy policies and
terms-of-service documentation, data collection, third-party sharing, data security, and web
tracking. This set of criteria is initially inspired by Mahmoud et al. [38] and Harkous et
al. [28], and then interactively refined throughout our study. For every criterion, a hotspot
may fully or partially satisfy it, not satisfy it, or may not provide relevant information.
Privacy policy and TOS documentation. An easily accessible privacy policy/TOS is im-
portant for communicating any privacy implications to the hotspot users.
P1 Captive-portal-links: The captive portal contains a link to the privacy policy document.
P2 Policy-change-information: The privacy policy has an update date; and the hotspot no-
tifies users of any changes to its privacy policy.
P3 TOS-Captive-portal-links: The captive portal contains a link to the TOS document.
P4 TOS-change-information: The TOS document has an update date; and the hotspot noti-
fies users of any changes to its terms of service.
Data collection. Hotspots may collect a wide range of personal information from users
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while trying to get access to the internet. We define the following criteria to evaluate data
collection practices in public WiFi hotspots:
C1 Laws-compliant-stated: The hotspot defines clearly the laws they comply with in its
privacy policy, and the jurisdiction(s) in which they operate.
C2 Report-data-collection: The hotspot is transparent about its data collection practices.
We validate the company actual data collection practices noted during our evaluation of
each hotspot.
C3 Collection-purpose-stated: The hotspot clearly communicates reasons for collecting
user information.
C4 No-children-data-collection: The hotspot must have a clear policy about data collected
from children and provide the ability for parents to permanently delete the collected infor-
mation.
C5 No-data-MAC-address-link: The hotspot does not link the MAC address to any per-
sonal information.
C6 PII-access-edit-delete: Users can access, edit or permanently delete the information
collected by the hotspot; partially granted if any option is missing.
Third-party sharing. Hotspots may share users’ data with third-parties and affiliates. We
define the following criteria to highlight hotspot’s user data sharing practices with third-
parties.
D1 No-third-party-data-sharing: The hotspot must explicitly state in its privacy policy
that it does not share any personal information. We inspect all communications between
the captive portal and back-end servers for third-party data sharing. We also check if the
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hotspots use third-party captive portals where they share personal information with third-
party.
D2 No-data-selling: The hotspot must explicitly state in its privacy policy that it does not
sell any personal information.
Data security. Protecting users’ information is a major concern as any leak could lead
to identification of individual users and their location. We define four features under this
category.
S1 Data-storage-location: The location of data storage is stated in privacy policy and it
matches the actual server location in our collected datasets.
S2 Secure-data-transfer: The measures taken by the hotspot captive portal operator to pro-
tect the collected information is properly documented in the privacy policy. We verify this
criteria by inspecting the hotspot use of TLS for all communications between the captive
portal and back-end servers.
S3 Dedicated-privacy-support: The hotspot has a dedicated support for privacy related is-
sues and concerns.
S4 Unsecure-internet-stated: The TOS must clearly state if the hotspot does not provide
any level of encryption to protect user data from eavesdropping (such as WEP, WPA or
other encryption mechanisms).
Web tracking. Hotspots can use various techniques to track users. This includes identi-
fiers locally stored on the user’s device by third-parties (e.g., HTTP cookies), which are
commonly used to uniquely identify users. We define the following criteria to highlight
data web tracking practices in hotspots.
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U1 No-cookies-before-user-consent: The captive portal should not perform any web track-
ing activities before the user consents her acceptance of terms and conditions. Currently,
we simply rate a hotspot by inspecting all communications between the captive portal and
back-end servers.
U2 Do-not-track-support: The documentation clearly states how the captive portal handles
Do Not Track (DNT) requests. DNT is an option available in some browsers, designed to
allow users to opt-out of web tracking.

















































































































































































































































Bombay Mahal Thali è ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○␣ ○␣ ○␣ ○␣ ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○
CF Carrefour Laval ○ è ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ è è ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○
CF Fairview Pointe Claire ○ è ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ è è ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○␣
Carrefour Angrignon è ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ è ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○
Centre Eaton ○ ○ ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○ è ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○
Centre Rockland è è ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○ è ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○␣ ○␣
Domino’s Pizza ○ è ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○ è è ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○␣
Dynamite* ○␣ è ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○ ○
Garage* ○␣ è ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○ ○␣
Grevin Montreal è ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ è è ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○
Hvmans Cafe ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ è ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Mail Champlain è è ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○ è è ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○␣
Nautilus Plus* ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ è ○ ○ ○␣ ○␣ ○␣ ○␣ ○
Place Montreal Trust ○ ○ ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○ è è ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○ ○␣
Roots ○ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○␣ è ○␣ ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○ ○␣
Vua Sandwiches è è ○ è ○ ○␣ ○ è è ○␣ ○␣ ○ ○␣ ○␣ ○
○= offers the options; è= partially offers the option; ○␣= does not offer the option; no circle = info. is unavailable.
(*) = There is no link to the document from the captive portal.
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5.2 Overview of Results
In this section, we present our evaluation for a sample of 16 representative policies of
hotspots that collect personal information from users; see Table 18 in Appendix D for links
to the documents.
For each hotspot, we manually inspect the privacy policy and TOS documents that
appear on the hotspot captive portal between September 2018 to April 2019. For three
hotspots, the captive portal did not have a link to the privacy policy document, hence we
evaluated the company privacy policy published on their website, including Dynamite,
Garage, and Nautilus Plus. A hotspot may appear to conform to privacy best practices
according to its documentation, but may fail to implement necessary technical measures.
Therefore, we use our collected hotspots’ datasets to validate some privacy practices, in-
cluding secure data transfer, data storage location, and data sharing. We emphasize that
our evaluation here is based on available privacy policies, terms of use documents and ana-
lyzing web traffic collected while testing each public WiFi. We discuss the findings of our
review of hotspots privacy policies along five axes; for a quick summary of our results refer
to Table 13. Section 5.3 explains the evaluation results for each hotspot.
Privacy policy and TOS documentation. We first look at whether the privacy policy and
TOS can be found easily on the public WiFi captive poral, and if users are notified upon
privacy policy and TOS changes. We found that 7 out of 16 hotspots provide a direct link
to their policies in their WiFi captive portal, 6 hotspots have the TOS and privacy policy
documents merged into one document, and 3 hotspots do not provide a direct link to their
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policies in their WiFi captive portal. However, although the changes to the privacy policy
and TOS are hard to be regularly monitored by public WiFi users, only 4 out 16 of public
WiFi hotpots stated that they actively notify users upon policy changes (Dynamite, Garage,
centre Eaton, Place Montreal Trust), and one public WiFi hotspot (Domino’s Pizza) posts
a notice of TOS changes to the captive portal.
Data collection. We first study the data collection behavior in the hotspots. We found the
data collection is mandatory to access the service in half of hotspots. We also found half of
hotspots fail to report what kind of data is collected from users to access the service. More-
over, we found 15/16 hotspots define generic reasons for collecting data from public WiFi
users, such as marketing and advertisement, customer survey, and for protecting users and
property. COPPA [24] states a verifiable parental consent must be obtained before gath-
ering any data from children below 13 years old. However, only 9/16 hotspots stated that
their service is not to be used by the children under the age of thirteen and provided the
possibility for the parent to delete their children data if it was collected without parental
consent. We found 11/16 hotspots read the user MAC address, but only two hotspots stated
explicitly that they link PII to MAC address—allowing long-term user tracking, including
Roots, and Bombay Mahal Thali. Finally, we found 11/16 allow users to access or edit
their information. However, seven hotspots do not state if the user can request to delete the
personal information, including Domino’s Pizza, Grevin Montreal, and Vua Sandwiches.
Moreover, three hotspots stated that it may be impossible to completely delete user infor-
mation without some residual information (e.g., due to backup), including Centre Eaton,
Roots, and Carrefour Angrignon. Alternatively, Hvmans Cafe states that customers can
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access/edit/delete their data by contacting the data protection officer. Lastly, we found
that most privacy policies (15/16) states explicitly the laws/acts they comply with. All
15 hotspots except Hvmans Cafe, comply with laws and courts of Canada while Hvmans
Cafe complies with laws and courts of Wales (U.K.). However, Nautilus Plus omits any
information about laws and courts from its privacy policy.
Third-party sharing. We first investigate personal data sharing with third-party. In to-
tal, we found 15/16 hotspots that share personal and unique information. For instance,
we found 11/16 hotspots that use third-party captive portals where they share personal
information with third-party, including Roots, and Bombay Mahal Thali; see Table 3 in
Chapter 3. By inspecting our collected network traffic, we also found 2/16 hotspots share
the user’s MAC address with third-party domains, including Domino’s Pizza and Place
Montreal Trust; both hotspots do not use a third-party captive portal. Moreover, we also
found 2/16 hotspots stated that they may share personal information with internal and ex-
ternal service providers, including Dynamite and Garage. However, we could not find any
network traffic in our dataset that in practice match the company stated data sharing policy.
In contrast, Nautilus Plus states that they may share data with third-party if required by law.
Finally, we found half of hotspots explicitly stated that they do not sell customer personal
information, including Nautilus Plus.
Data security. We first study the data storage location; we found 8/16 hotspots (includ-
ing Hvmans Cafe, Fairview Pointe-Claire, and Carrefour Laval) stated that PII may be
stored outside Canada. However, the Hvmans Cafe is the only public WiFi among the eight
hotspots that clearly states the data storage location is New York (which match the actual
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server location in our datasets 9). We also found half of hotspots omit any information
about the PII storage location, including Dynamite and Vua Sandwiches. Next, we study
whether the public WiFi hotspot takes the necessary measures (e.g., makes use of encryp-
tion) to transfer personal information to the server. Primarily, we check the policies to see
if the hotspot states which security measures are used to protect personal information. We
found 12/16 hotspots discuss security measures in their privacy policies. However, 7/12
of those hotspots concluded that no collection or transmission of information over the In-
ternet can be guaranteed to be 100% secure, including Centre Rockland, Place Montreal
Trust, and Roots. After that, we verify the hotspots network traffic of those hotspots and
we found 4/12 hotspots do not conform with their privacy policies since they send personal
information via HTTP. Two hotspots transmit the user’s full name via HTTP (Place Mon-
treal Trust and Roots). In Place Montreal Trust, the user’s full name is saved in a cookie
(valid for five years), and each time the user connects to the captive portal, the cookie is
automatically transmitted via HTTP. Moreover, three hotspots leak the user’s email address
via HTTP (Dynamite, Roots, and Garage). So in total, we found 8/16 hotspots comply with
secure-data-transfer (S2) criteria.
Web tracking. The European General Data Protection Regulation(GDPR) [45] have clear
provisions stating that websites must display a (cookie) consent notice prior to saving cook-
ies on the user browser. However, we found 6/16 hotspots create persistent cookies even
before getting user consent on their privacy/TOS documents. We also study if the hotspot
9We find the server location by extracting the contacted IP address of the hotspot main domain from
network traces then use the Reverse IP Address lookup API( http://free.ipwhois.io/json/) to identify the server
location information
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clarifies the danger of using un-encrypted public WiFi in their TOS; and we found 14/16
comply with this criterion. We also found two hotspots explicitly stated that they do not
respond to the browser “Do not track” signals.
5.3 Detailed Evaluation of Privacy Policies
In this section, we present individual evaluation for the hotspots reviewed in this chapter
where we elaborate on how we rate each hotspot.
5.3.1 Bombay Mahal Thali Hotspot
Bombay Mahal Thali hotspot is powered by SY5 [55]. It partially satisfies Captive-portal-
links; it includes some privacy information in the TOS document, including collection
of personal information (e.g., Facebook information). Nevertheless, it does not satisfy
Update-info-information (P2 and P4) because it does not state the last date of update in the
documentation, and at the same time, it states that the users must check back the TOS for
any changes, implying that the hotspot does not notify the user with changes. The hotspot
states that it collects user’s email address, date of birth, and current city. It also states
that they may collect PII from (i) Facebook basic information, including age, birthdate,
name, gender; extended profile information, including events, check-ins, Facebook likes,
interests, friends, friends of friends, groups. (ii) Twitter profile, including screen name,
name, location, profile picture. The user cannot use the service without providing an email
address or sign-in using a Facebook account. In practice, they collect less information
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than stated (name, email address, birthday, and current city), hence, we rate this hotspot as
satisfying Report-data-collection (C2) feature. This hotspot does not satisfy no-data-MAC-
address-link (C5) criteria because it links PII to MAC address as stated explicitly in the
privacy policy. The hotspot lacks data-storage-location (S1); its captive portal domain in the
US as appears from collected network traffic. The hotspot does not satisfy the secure-data-
transfer (S2) as the hotspot does not explain security measures implemented to protect user
personal information. It also does not use HTTPS protocol for all web traffic which expose
the MAC address and last visited site. It also does not satisfy Dedicated-privacy-support
(S3) as they have a generic email address for sharing privacy concerns. The hotspot lacks
no-third-party-data-sharing (D2) because the hotspot shares data with third-party captive
portal. Finally, the hotspot is governed by the federal laws of the province of Ontario and
the federal laws of Canada.
5.3.2 CF Fairview Pointe Claire and CF Carrefour Laval hotspots
CF Fairview Pointe Claire and CF Carrefour Laval are two shopping malls that are man-
aged by Cadillac Fairview [12]. The two hotspots are powered by Aislelabs [7] and have
the same TOS and privacy policy documents. Both hotspots partially satisfy update-info-
information (P2) since they fail to notify the user with any update details to the privacy
policy, although the policy indicates the update date. They also do not satisfy update-info-
information (P4) as they do not include the last update date in the TOS, and they may update
the TOS without notifying the users. The user cannot use the service without providing an
email address or sign-in using a Facebook account. In practice, the hotspots collect the
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name, email address, gender, birthday, current city, profile picture, hometown, and Face-
book likes using social media accounts and registration form. However, the privacy policy
does not clarify exactly what information is collected from social accounts. Hence, we
rate the two hotspots as not satisfying Report-data-collection (2) feature. They also stated
that they collect information through social media when the user post information related
to the company, its service or its properties. They also mention that they collect usage in-
formation, such as pages viewed or searched for; and that they collect browser and device
information, such as browser type and version, operating system, MAC address, and device
type. Both hotspots stated that PII are stored in Canada. However, they may use service
providers who process or store information outside of Canada. The two hotspots partially
satisfy no-data-MAC-address-link (C5) because they read the user device MAC address so,
they may link PII to the MAC address. Finally, the hotspot is governed by the laws and
courts Canada.
5.3.3 Carrefour Angrignon
Although Carrefour Angrignon is powered by Eye-In [22] but the privacy policy docu-
ment is slightly different from the Mail Champlain and Centre Rockland hotspots, pow-
ered by the same company. Carrefour Angrignon has the TOS and privacy policy doc-
uments merged into one document. Hence captive-portal-links (P1) is rated as partially
provided. It does not satisfy update-info-information (P2) as it does not include the last
update date in the privacy policy section, and at the same time, it does not notify the user
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with changes (similar rating for TOS P4). The hotspot collects name, email address, pro-
file picture, LinkedIn headlines, current employment, Tweets, and people you follow from
LinkedIn. However, the privacy policy only states that they collect MAC addresses and/or
IP addresses, hence, we rate the hotspot as lacking support to report-data-collection (C2)
feature. Carrefour Angrignon states that personal information about user will not be sold
without the user’s approval. We rate Carrefour Angrignon as partially satisfying PII-access-
edit-delete (C6) because although it allows users to access/update/delete PII but the policy
states that it may be impossible to completely delete user information without some re-
maining residue. The hotspot lacks data-storage-location (S1); its captive portal domain in
the US. It also does not satisfy dedicated-privacy-support (S3) as the user can share privacy
concerns through a generic email address or by sending a regular mail to the company. We
rate the hotspot as satisfying the collection-purpose-stated (C3) since it states that the com-
pany uses the collected data for operation and security; fraud prevention; and protecting
users and property. The hotspot lacks no-third-party-data-sharing (D2) because the hotspot
shares data with third-party captive portal. Finally, the hotspot is governed by the laws and
courts of Quebec (Canada).
5.3.4 Centre Eaton
Although Centre Eaton is powered by Eye-In [22], the privacy policy document is com-
pletely different from the other hotspots powered by the same company. However, Centre
Eaton shares the same policy and TOS with Place Montreal Trust as they are both owned
by Ivanhoe Cambridge [31]. Centre Eaton does not satisfy update-info-information (P4)
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as it does not include the last update date in the TOS, and it may update the TOS with-
out notice to users. Centre Eaton satisfies update-info-information (P2) as it includes the
last update date in the privacy policy, and it notify users of the existence of a new Privacy
Policy. The privacy policy provides a clear description of the personal information that
might be collected. In practice, the hotspot collects the name, email address, and profile
picture. Hence, we rate the hotspot as supporting the report-data-collection (C2) feature.
We rate Centre Eaton as partially satisfying PII-access-edit-delete (C6) because although
it allows users to request to access/update/delete PII but the policy clarifies it may be im-
possible to completely delete customer information without some residual information be-
cause of backups. The hotspot does not satisfy data-storage-location (S1); the hotspot may
store users’ personal information outside of Canada. We rate the hotspot as satisfying the
collection-purpose-stated (C3) since it states that the company uses the collected data for
example, to understand and assess customers interests. Centre Eaton states that personal
information about user will not be sold without the user’s approval. The hotspot lacks
no-third-party-data-sharing (D2) because the hotspot shares data with third-party captive
portal. Finally, this hotspot is governed by the laws and courts of Quebec (Canada).
5.3.5 Centre Rockland and Mail Champlain
Centre Rockland and Mail Champlain are two shopping malls that are managed by Com-
inar [14]. The two hotspots are powered by Eye-In [22]. They share the same TOS and
privacy policy documents. Both documents are merged together. Hence captive-portal-
links (P1) is rated as partially provided. They also partially satisfy update-info-information
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(P2) as they include the last update date in the privacy policy section; and at the same time,
they stated that the users must check back the document for any changes, implying that the
hotspot does not notify the user with changes. They do not satisfy update-info-information
(P4) as they do not include the last update date in the TOS section, and they fail to mention
whether they keep the users updated with any changes in the TOS section. The hotspot
collects name, email address, profile picture, LinkedIn headlines, current employment, and
LinkedIn basic profile. However, the privacy policy only states that they collect personal
information but did not specify exactly which information they are collecting from the
user’s account, hence, we rate the hotspot as lacking support to report-data-collection (C2)
feature. We rate both hotspots as partially satisfying PII-access-edit-delete (C6) because
although they allow users to inspect PII by contacting the privacy manager, the policy does
not state if the user can request to update/delete the personal information. Although both
hotspots have the same policy; they are hosted on two different domains. This affects
the no-cookies-before-user-consent (U1) evaluation as Centre Rockland creates two cook-
ies valid for 30 minutes before user consent while Mail Champlain does not. Moreover,
Centre Rockland has a cookie that has the user’s device MAC address while Mail Cham-
plain does not have this cookie, which imply completely different implementation of the
hotspots’ captive portals. They do not satisfy data-storage-location (S1) as they may store
the information in Canada or the US or any other country. We rate the hotspot as satisfying
the collection-purpose-stated (C3) since it states that the company uses the collected data
for example, to send information about services, promotions, surveys. The hotspot lacks
no-third-party-data-sharing (D2) because the hotspot shares data with third-party captive
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portal. Finally, the two hotspots are governed by the laws and courts of Quebec (Canada).
5.3.6 Domino’s Pizza Hotspot
Domino’s Pizza hotspot partially satisfies update-info-information (P2) because it does not
contain the last date of update in the privacy policy, although, they stated that a notice is
posted for privacy policy changes on its homepage. Moreover, it does not state how users
are notified of any TOS changes, and at the same time, it does not contain the last date
of update in the TOS, thus not fulfilling update-info-information (P4). The privacy policy
provides a clear description of the personal information that might be collected (name,
email address and telephone). In practice, the hotspot collects the email address. Hence,
we rate the hotspot as supporting the report-data-collection (C2) feature. We rate Domino’s
Pizza as partially satisfying PII-access-edit-delete (C6) because although it allows users
to access/update PII by contacting the privacy manager, the policy does not state if the
user can request to delete the personal information. It does not satisfy no-third-party-data-
sharing (D2) since it shares personal information with professional advisors, suppliers,
franchisees, agencies, and provides users’ personal information in case of a law or court
order. The hotspot also shares the user’s MAC address with network-auth.com. We rate
Domino’s Pizza as not satisfying the no-cookies-before-user-consent (U1) as it creates a
cookie from the domain network-auth.com, which is valid for 31 days before the user clicks
the Connect button. We rate the hotspot as satisfying the collection-purpose-stated (C3)
since it states that the company uses the collected data for example, to receive deals. The
hotspot lacks data-storage-location (S1); its captive portal domain in the US. This hotspot
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partially satisfies no-data-MAC-address-link (C5) because they read the user device MAC
address so, they may link PII to the MAC address. Finally, this hotspot governed by the
laws and courts of Ontario (Canada).
5.3.7 Dynamite and Garage Hotspots
Dynamite and Garage are two brands of Groupe Dynamite. They use the same terms of
service for their hotspots. Both hotspots do not provide privacy policy documents, hence
captive-portal-links (P1) and update-info-information (P2) features are inapplicable. How-
ever, we evaluated their privacy policy documents that are available on their website. Both
hotspots do not include the last update date in the privacy policy, and their privacy policies
stated that they may notify users about important changes by email or other means. They
do not satisfy update-info-information (P4) as they do not include the last update date in
the TOS, and do not notify users with updates in the TOS. The user cannot use the service
without providing an email address. However, the privacy policy states that email address
may be collected for the user to receive email updates. Hence, we rate this hotspot as
satisfying report-data-collection (C2) feature. Although the two hotspots stated that they
provide the necessary measures to protect personal information, they leak the user’s email
address via HTTP. Hence, they do not satisfy the secure-data-transfer (S2). We rate the
hotspot as satisfying the collection-purpose-stated (C3) since it states that the company
uses the collected data for example, to receive offers. They do not sell personal infor-
mation, except if its part of the sale of all or part of the company business or a property.
The hotspots do not satisfy no-third-party-data-sharing (D2) criterion because the hotspots
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stated in their policy that they may share personal information with internal and external
service providers but we did not find any traces for sharing data with third-parties in the
web traffic. The hotspots lack data-storage-location (S1); their captive portal domains in
the Canada. This hotspot partially satisfies no-data-MAC-address-link (C5) because they
read the user device MAC address so, they may link PII to the MAC address. Finally, the
two hotspots are Laws-compliant with the laws of the province where the service is used.
5.3.8 Grevin Montreal Hotspot
Although Grevin Montreal is powered by Eye-In [22], its document is slightly different
from most hotspots powered by the same company, including Mail Champlain, Centre
Rockland, and Carrefour Angrignon hotspots. Grevin Montreal has the TOS and privacy
policy documents merged into one document. Hence, captive-portal-links (P1) is rated as
partially provided. It does not satisfy update-info-information (P2) as it does not include
the last update date in the privacy policy section; and at the same time, it does not notify the
user with changes (similar rating for TOS P4). Grevin Montreal states that personal infor-
mation about user will not be sold without the user’s approval. The hotspot collects name,
email address, current city, profile picture, LinkedIn headlines, current employment, # of
kids, and postal code, and LinkedIn basic profile. However, the privacy policy only states
that they collect MAC addresses and/or IP addresses, hence, we rate the hotspot as lacking
support to report-data-collection (C2) feature. We rate Grevin Montreal as partially sat-
isfying PII-access-edit-delete (C6) because although it allows users to access/update PII,
the policy does not state if the user can request to delete the personal information. The
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hotspot does not satisfy the secure-data-transfer (S2) as the hotspot does not explain se-
curity measures implemented to protect user personal information. It also does not use
HTTPS protocol for all web traffic which expose the device’s MAC Address. It does not
satisfy dedicated-privacy-support (S3) since it has a generic email address and specifies
possibility to send a regular mail to generic address for sharing privacy concerns. The
hotspot lacks data-storage-location (S1); its captive portal domain in the US. We rate the
hotspot as satisfying the collection-purpose-stated (C3) since it states that the company
uses the collected data for example, marketing purposes. The hotspot lacks no-third-party-
data-sharing (D2) because the hotspot shares data with third-party captive portal. Finally,
this hotspot is governed by the laws and courts of Quebec (Canada).
5.3.9 Hvmans Cafe Hotspot
Hvmans Cafe Hotspot does not satisfy update-info-information (P2) feature since it does
not include the last update date in the policy, and does not notify users with policy updates
(similar rating for TOS P4). The hotspot collects user’s full name, email address, current
city, profile picture, Facebook likes, Instagram profile information and media. The Insta-
gram profile includes the user’s email address, mobile phone number, user ID, full name,
gender, biography, website, and profile picture. However, the privacy policy only states that
they name, postal address, phone number, email address, date of birth, gender, and social
media account details (such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) without much details
on information that are shared from social media account, hence, we rate the hotspot as
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lacking support to report-data-collection (C2) feature. The hotspot satisfies data-storage-
location (S1); it stores the user’s personal Information in New York for data collected in
North and South America. We rate the hotspot as satisfying the collection-purpose-stated
(C3) since it states that the company uses the collected data for example, to communicate
with customers or to offer customers relevant goods and services. The hotspot lacks no-
third-party-data-sharing (D2) because the hotspot shares data with third-party captive por-
tal. We rate Hvmans Cafe as satisfying PII-access-edit-delete (C6) because it allows users
to access/update/delete PII upon providing a proof of their identity. Finally, this hotspot
governed by the laws and courts of Wales (U.K.).
5.3.10 Nautilus Plus Hotspot
Nautilus Plus hotspot does not provide a link to the privacy policy document, hence the
captive-portal-links (P1), and policy-change-information (P2), features are inapplicable.
However, we evaluated its privacy policy document that is available on their website. This
privacy policy does not include the last update date in the privacy policy, and it does not
state that they may notify users about important changes. The hotspots lack data-storage-
location (S1); its captive portal domain could not be located due to the use of local IP
address. The user cannot use the service without providing an email address. However, the
privacy policy states that email address may be collected for the user to receive newslet-
ter and promotions. Hence, we rate this hotspot as satisfying report-data-collection (C2)
feature. This hotspot partially satisfies no-data-MAC-address-link (C5) because they read
the user device MAC address so, they may link PII to the MAC address. The hotspot does
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not satisfy the secure-data-transfer (S2) as the hotspot does not explain security measures
implemented to protect user personal information. It also does not use HTTPS protocol for
all web traffic which leak the user’s personal information. The leak happens while the user
tries to connect to the hotspot. In Nautilus Plus, a user must enter her membership number
in the captive portal. For partially entered membership numbers, the captive portal verifies
the identity by displaying personal information of five people in a scrambled way (first and
last names, postal codes, ages, dates of birth, and phone numbers), over HTTP. The user
then chooses the right combination corresponding to her personal information. We also
confirmed that some of this data belongs to real people by authenticating to this hotspot
using ten randomly generated partial membership numbers. Then, we use the reversed
lookup in canada411.ca to confirm the correlation between the returned phone numbers,
names, and addresses.
5.3.11 Place Montreal Trust Hotspot
Although Place Montreal Trust is powered by Eye-In [22], its documents are completely
different from most hotspots powered by the same company. However, Place Montreal
Trust shares the same policy and TOS with Center Eaton as they both owned by Ivanhoe
Cambridge [31]. Place Montreal Trust does not satisfy update-info-information (P4) since
it does not include the last update date in the TOS, and it may update the TOS without
notice to users. Place Montreal Trust satisfies update-info-information (P2) since it includes
the last update date in the privacy policy, and it notify users of the existence of a new
Privacy Policy. The privacy policy provides a clear description of the personal information
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that might be collected. In practice, the hotspot collects the name, country, and postal
code. Hence, we rate the hotspot as supporting the report-data-collection (C2) feature.
We rate Place Montreal Trust as partially satisfying PII-access-edit-delete (C6) because
although it allows users to access/update PII but the policy does not specify clearly if the
user can request to delete the personal information. However, the hotspot may store users’
personal information outside of Canada. Although the hotspots states that they provide
the necessary measures to protect personal information, they leak the user’s full name via
HTTP. Hence, they do not satisfy the secure-data-transfer (S2). We rate Place Montreal
Trust as not satisfying the no-cookies-before-user-consent (U1) since it creates multiple
cookies before the user clicks the Connect button. These persistent cookies are valid for
periods varying from several days to a year. We rate the hotspot as satisfying the collection-
purpose-stated (C3) since it states that the company uses the collected data for example, to
understand and assess customers interests. The hotspot shares the user’s MAC address with
third-party domains, including network-auth.com and doubleclick.net. Finally, this hotspot
is governed by the laws and courts of Quebec (Canada).
5.3.12 Roots Hotspot
Roots hotspot uses third-party captive portal powered by Yelp WiFi [63] for its hotspot.
In this hotspot, the users must enter their full name, and email to be granted access to the
internet; and their MAC address and PII are linked together as clearly stated in the pol-
icy. Yelp WiFi states that they work with the Future of Privacy Forum [23] to ensure their
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practices adhere to the most ethical and moral standards. It does not provide the update-
info-information (P2) because it does not state the last date of update and it states that users
must check back the policy for any changes, implying that they do not notify the user with
changes. It does not satisfy update-info-information (P4) because it does not state the last
date of update and it states that users must check back the TOS for any changes, implying
that they do not notify the user with changes. The privacy policy provides a clear descrip-
tion of the personal information that might be collected (e.g., name, email address and
telephone). In practice, the hotspot collects the email address. Hence, we rate the hotspot
as supporting the report-data-collection (C2) feature. The hotspot is governed by the laws
and courts of Ontario and the federal laws of Canada. We rate roots hotspot as partially
satisfying PII-access-edit-delete (C6) because although they allow users to access/update
PII but the data cannot be completely deleted due to their backup process. Although the
hotspots states that they provide the necessary measures to protect personal information,
they leak the user’s full name via HTTP. Hence, they do not satisfy the secure-data-transfer
(S2). It is also leaked if an adversary capture and reply the HTTP traffic, and in this case
the user’s full name appears in the browser to the attacker, see Figure 7. We rate the Roots’
hotspot as not satisfying the no-cookies-before-user-consent (U1) since it creates a cookie
from the domain network-auth.com, which is valid for 31 days before the user clicks the
Connect button. This hotspot also does not satisfy no-data-MAC-address-link (C5) because
they explicitly stated that they link PII to MAC address. The hotspot lacks data-storage-
location (S1); its captive portal domain in the US. We rate the hotspot as satisfying the
collection-purpose-stated (C3) since it states that the company uses the collected data for
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example, to improve marketing and promotional efforts. The hotspot lacks no-third-party-
data-sharing (D2) because the hotspot shares data with third-party captive portal. Finally,
the hotspot is governed by the federal laws of the province of Ontario and the federal laws
of Canada.
Figure 7: Roots hotspot leaks the user full name if an adversary capture and reply the HTTP
traffic, and in this case the user’s full name appears in the browser to the attacker.
5.3.13 Vua Sandwiches Hotspot
Vua Sandwiches is powered by coolblue [15]. Vua Sandwiches has the TOS and privacy
policy documents merged into one document. Hence captive-portal-links (P1) is rated as
partially provided. It partially satisfies update-info-information (P2) since it includes the
last update date in the privacy policy section, and at the same time, it does not notify the user
with changes (similar rating for TOS P4). The hotspot collects the name, email address,
phone number, and profile picture through registration form or use Facebook social login.
However, the privacy policy only states that they collect the name, and social media account
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details without much details on information that are shared from social media account,
hence, we rate the hotspot as lacking support to report-data-collection (C2) feature. We
rate Vua Sandwiches as partially satisfying PII-access-edit-delete (C6) because although
it allows users to access/update PII but the policy does not specify clearly if the user can
request to delete the personal information. It does not satisfy data-storage-location (S1)
as PII may be maintained in Canada, the US or any other country. It also does not satisfy
dedicated-privacy-support (S3) as they have a generic email address for sharing privacy
concerns. The hotspot lacks no-third-party-data-sharing (D2) because the hotspot shares
data with third-party captive portal. Finally, the hotspot is governed by the federal laws of
the province of Ontario and the laws of Canada.
5.4 Conclusion
We outline a group of criteria for evaluating various privacy aspects in hotspots - to help
us better understand if hotspot privacy policy conforms to privacy best practices and if
they implement necessary technical measures to comply with them. We use our collected
hotspots’ datasets to validate 16 privacy policy and TOS documents from hotspots that ap-
pear to be most risky in Chapter 3. We highlight several concerns in the privacy practices
of those hotspots, especially in the area of data collection, secure data transfer, data shar-
ing, data storage location, and web tracking. We augment our policy analysis by using
our collected hotspots’ datasets to validate some of those privacy practices. Our analysis
reveals many instances where the hotspot may appear to conform to privacy best practices
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Many people across the world use public WiFi offered by an increasing number of busi-
nesses and public/government services. The use of VPNs, and the adoption of HTTPS in
most websites and mobile apps largely secure users’ personal/financial data from a mali-
cious hotspot provider and other users of the same hotspot. However, device/user tracking
as enabled by hotspots due to their access to MAC address and PII, remains as a significant
privacy threat, which has not been explored thus far. Our analysis shows clear evidence of
privacy risks and calls for more thorough scrutiny of these public hotspots by e.g., privacy
advocates and government regulators.
In here, we provide some insightful and worthy recommendations that could protect
users’ privacy when using public WiFi hotspots. Our recommendations for hotspots users
include the following: Users should avoid sharing any personal information with the hotspot
(social media or registration forms). To reduce user tracking, users should use private
browsing and possibly some other anti-tracking browser addons, and software programs
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that may allow to use a fake MAC address on Windows. They should also clear the browser
history after visiting a hotspot if private browsing mode is not used, and update the setting
to stop automatic connection to public Wi-Fi Services. To protect personal data, users
should use a VPN when connecting to a public WiFi network; or use some addons that
force the browser to use encryption on captive portals that does not use HTTPS— the ad-
dons do not protect on all captive portals so users should check for https in the URL to
make sure a captive portal is secure.
When connecting to public WiFi from Android, Android stores persistent cookies in
the captive portal app. These cookies are not erased when the portal app is closed, or when
the user leaves the hotspot. Instead, the cookies remain active as set in their validity peri-
ods. Hotspots can use these cookies to uniquely identify and authenticate user devices even
when the device MAC address is dynamically changed. A better approach is to erase those
cookies when the captive portal app is closed. As for device fingerprinting, Android could
start blocking third-party requests to companies that are known to participate in fingerprint-
ing users—e.g., Disconnect [17] maintains a list of companies that fingerprint users.
On Windows, the captive portal is loaded in the default regular browser and hence
embedded trackers are available to all websites visited by the users. A better approach is to
open the captive portal in the private browsing mode and start blocking third-party requests
to companies that are known to participate in fingerprinting (e.g., Disconnect fingerprinting
list [17]). Doing so not only reduces the stateful user tracking (cookie-based) but also
enables users to reduce stateless user tracking (device fingerprinting) and gives users the
flexibility to install some additional anti-tracking browser addons.
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In what follows, we provide a summary of some possible future work directions:
• More automation. This will allow us to improve our coverage and collect/analyze
data from more cities across the world.
• In our work, we provided a high-level analysis of tracking in Europe and the US
public WiFi captive portals (Chapter 4). We need to consider a more in-depth study
similar to our analysis to the Canadian hotspots in Chapter 3, including analysis of
data collection and share practices, HTTPS adoption of captive portals, and analyze
stateful or stateless tracking behaviors.
• We need to update our framework to measure device fingerprinting on Android.
• We only designed a data collection framework (CPInspector) for both Windows
and Android. It is useful to create data collection framework for macOS and iOS.
This may also help us to extend our study to provide a comparison between hotspots
privacy practices on multiple platforms.
• For greater scalability (as opposed to our current manual analysis), our analytical
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Table 14: List of persistent cookies valid for five years of more.
Hotspot Scope Third-Party Tracker Base-Domain Name Years
CF Carrefour Laval Captive Portal Yes No network-auth.com p_session_id 20
CF Fairview Pointe Claire Captive Portal Yes No network-auth.com p_session_id 20
CHU Sainte-Justine Landing Page No No chusj.org VisitorStatus 20
CIBC Bank Landing Page Yes Yes stackadapt.com sa-user-id-v2 5
CIBC Bank Landing Page Yes Yes stackadapt.com sa-user-id 5
CIBC Bank Landing Page No No cibc.com atgRecVisitorId 19
Carrefour Angrignon Captive Portal Yes No google.ca CONSENT 19
Carrefour Angrignon Captive Portal Yes No google.com CONSENT 19
Discount Location d’Auto Landing Page Yes No wayfair.com CSNBrief 10
Discount Location d’Auto Landing Page Yes No wayfair.com CSNUtId 10
Fido Landing Page No No fido.ca ClicktaleReplayLink 81
Fido Landing Page No No fido.ca optimizelyBuckets 10
Fido Landing Page No No fido.ca optimizelySegments 10
Fido Landing Page No No fido.ca optimizelyEndUserId 10
Fido Landing Page No No fido.ca language 68
Fido Landing Page No No fido.ca province 68
Fido Landing Page No No fido.ca TLTUID 10
Fossil Landing Page Yes No pbbl.co pp_uid 25
Fossil Landing Page No No fossil.com _br_uid_2 99
Fossil Landing Page No No fossil.com s_fid 5
GAP Brands Landing Page No No gapcanada.ca s_chan 5
GAP Brands Landing Page No No gapcanada.ca s_fid 5
Harvey’s Landing Page No No harveys.ca optimizelyEndUserId 10
Harvey’s Captive Portal Yes No network-auth.com p_session_id 20
Harvey’s Landing Page No No harveys.ca optimizelyDomainTestCookie 10
Hvmans Cafe Captive Portal Yes No instagram.com mid 10
Hvmans Cafe Captive Portal Yes No instagram.com mcd 10
Ikea Landing Page No No ikea.com s_pers 5
Ikea Landing Page No No ikea.com s_fid 5
Juliette Et Chocolat Landing Page No No julietteetchocolat.com secure_customer_sig 20
Laura Landing Page No No laura.ca liveagent_ptid 10
Laura Landing Page No No laura.ca liveagent_vc 10
Laura Landing Page No No laura.ca liveagent_oref 10
Laura Landing Page No No laura.ca optimizelyBuckets 10
Laura Landing Page No No laura.ca optimizelySegments 10
Laura Landing Page No No laura.ca optimizelyEndUserId 10
McDonald’s Captive Portal Yes No network-auth.com p_session_id 20
Pizza Pizza Landing Page Yes No intentiq.com AWSELB 10
Pizza Pizza Landing Page Yes No intentiq.com IQPData 10
Pizza Pizza Landing Page Yes No intentiq.com intentIQ 10
Pizza Pizza Landing Page Yes No intentiq.com ASDT 10
Pizza Pizza Landing Page Yes No intentiq.com CSDT 10
Pizza Pizza Landing Page Yes No intentiq.com intentIQCDate 10
Pizza Pizza Landing Page Yes No intentiq.com IQver 10
Place Montreal Trust Captive Portal No No placemontrealtrust.com welcome_info_name 5
Place Montreal Trust Captive Portal No No placemontrealtrust.com expected_tab 5
Roots Landing Page Yes No instagram.com mid 10
Roots Captive Portal Yes No instagram.com mcd 10
Roots Captive Portal Yes No network-auth.com p_session_id 20
ScotiaBank Landing Page No No scotiabank.com site 20
TD Bank Landing Page No No td.com s_pers 5
TD Bank Landing Page Yes No owneriq.net si 5
Tim Hortons Captive Portal Yes No network-auth.com p_session_id 20
Via Rail Station Captive Portal Yes No network-auth.com p_session_id 20
Walmart Landing Page No No walmart.ca btc 10
Walmart Landing Page No No walmart.ca vtc 10
Walmart Landing Page No No walmart.ca og_session_id 20
Walmart Landing Page No No walmart.ca walmart.id 9
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Appendix B
Examples of Social Media Use
In here, we provide examples of social login messages presented to the user requesting




Figure 8: Examples of social login messages presented to the user from LinkedIn and
Twitter. (Images quality is limited because they were automatically captured by our data




Figure 9: Examples of social login messages presented to the user from Facebook and
Instagram. (Images quality is limited because they were automatically captured by our
data collection framework which depends on the resolution supported by Selenium).
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Appendix C
List of Evaluated Hotspots Worldwide
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Table 15: List of evaluated hotspots from Canada.
Category Region Count Hotspot Name
Retail business Ontario 16
Anthropologie, MAC Cosmetics, NYX,
Roots, Sephora, Spence Diamonds, Vans,
Bluenotes, Brisk, Gap, H&M, Laura,
LCBO, The Childrens Place, Tip Top,
Walmart
Cafe and Restaurant Ontario 9
McDonald’s, ONroute, A&W Restau-
rants, The Second Cup, Sobeys, South St.
Burger, Starbucks, Subway, Tim Hortons
Telecom Kiosk Ontario 3 Fido, Rogers, Telus
Bank Ontario 2 National Bank of Canada, TD Bank
Shopping Mall Ontario 2 Rideau Centre, Bayshore
Hairdresser Ontario 1 First Choice Haircutters
Cafe and Restaurant Quebec 19
Copper Branch, Bombay Mahal Thali,
Hvmans Cafe, Pizza Pizza, Vua Sand-
wiches, Sushi STE-Catherine, Cafe
Osmo, The Second Cup, A&W Restau-
rants, Domino’s Pizza, Juliette Et
Chocolat, Burger King, McDonald’s,
Starbucks, Tim Hortons, Harvey’s,
Moose BAWR, Pizza Hut, Nespresso
Retail business Quebec 17
GAP, Dynamite, Fossil, Ikea, Laura,
SAQ, Maison Simmons, Roots, Wal-
mart, H&M, Home Depot, Canadian
Tire, Garage, IGA, ECCO, Michael Kors,
Sephora
Shopping Mall Quebec 12
Complexe Desjardins, Carrefour iA,
Place Montreal Trust, Place Vertu, Centre
Eaton, Fairview Pointe-Claire, Carrefour
Angrignon, Carrefour Laval, Mail Cham-
plain, Place Ville Marie, Atrium 1000,
Centre Rockland
Bank Quebec 5
RBC Bank,TD Bank, ScotiaBank, CIBC
Bank, Desjardins 360
Art and Entertainment Quebec 4
Place Des Arts, Grevin Montreal, YMCA,
Montreal Science Centre
Transportation Quebec 3
Gare d’autocars de Montréal, Via Rail
Station, YUL Airport
Telecom Kiosk Quebec 2 Fido,Telus
Car Rental Quebec 1 Discount Car Rental
Gymnasium Quebec 1 Nautilus Plus
Hospital Quebec 1 CHU Sainte-Justine
Hotel Quebec 1 Fairmont Hotel
Library Quebec 1 Westmount Public Library
91
Table 16: List of evaluated hotspots from Europe.
Category Region Count Hotspot Name
Retail business Luxembourg 18 Arket, Auchun, Cactus, Cartier, CHANEL, Cora,
COS, Ernster, Gucci, H&M, Jack & Jones, Louis
Vuitton, MAC Cosmetics, Other Stories, Paris XL,
Veritas ,A.S Adventure, Weekdays
Cafe and Restaurant Luxembourg 12 Brochettes et Cie, Burger King, Chi-Chis, EXKI
Wifi, Fischer, KIKI, Laudree, Namur, Pizza Hut,
Rock Box, Victorine, Zulu
Shopping Mall Luxembourg 4 City Concorde, Cloche d’Or, Galerie Auchan
Kirchberg, La Belle Etoile
Bank Luxembourg 2 BCEE,ING
City WiFi Luxembourg 2 CityWiFi, VDL
Transportation Luxembourg 2 Central Station, Luxembourg Airport
Hotel Luxembourg 1 DoubleTree Hilton
Other Luxembourg 1 Orderbird AG
Transportation Netherlands 2 Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam Central Station
Hotel Netherlands 1 The Manor Amsterdam-NL
Transportation France 2 Paris Airport, My Paris Airport
Table 17: List of evaluated hotspots from the US.
Category Region Count Hotspot Name
Cafe and Restaurant New York 10 Andersons, Burger King, Dunkin Donuts, Chili’s,
McDonald’s, Old Country Buffet, Starbucks, Taco
Bell,Tim Hortons, Tinder Box
Retail business New York 9 Barnes & Noble, Bed Bath & Beyond, Best Buy,
Famous Footwear, Lowe’s, Petco, Michaels, Party
City, Lowes
Art and Entertainment New York 2 Niagara Falls State Park, Maid of the Mist Boat
Tour
Bank New York 2 M&T Bank, Key Bank
Auto Repair New York 1 Firestone Complete Auto Care
Hotel New York 1 Super 8
Telecom Kiosk New York 1 Spectrum
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Appendix D
Hotspots Privacy Policy Links
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Table 18: Links to evaluated hotspots’ privacy policies and terms of service.




















































































































(*) = There is no link to the document from the captive portal.
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